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Ihis thesis deals with ccucepts or strategy and logis-
tics ir tt€ military and business fields. In particular, it
is cc£C€in€d kith the relationships hetveen nilitary
strategy and logistics. It recommends a logistics strategy
ior the defense of the BepuiDlic of Korea. Traditicrally,
the logistics has teen treated as secondary. But, in
current situations, attention must he placed on logistics,
lour steps are needed by the BOX military forces in the
long-tern point cf vieu. First, the commanders or planners
of the fCK military forces should understand the concepts
and true neanings of logistics for defense policy. Second,
the BCK military forces should have an organization vhich
can deal with the logistics support of the O.S. or allied
countries ir case of the threats or hostilities by the North
Korea. Ihird, life-cycle costing methods should he consid-
ered as an acguisition strategy. Fourth, the weapons
procurement process needs scue change, especially in the
oiddleiar acencies.
lABLE CF COMIENTS ''"^*^' ^-^^'FORAIIA 93343
I. INIECDUCTION 10
II. SIE^IEGY AND SlfiATEGIC flANAGEMENT 12
A- THE CONCiEI OF SIEATEGI 12
1- The Origin of the Concept of Strategy . . 13
2- The Ccncept of Strategy in Military
Field 14
3. The CcEcept of Strategy in Business
Managciient 17
E- STRATEGIC MANAGEMEKT IN BUSINESS FIELDS ... 19
1. Defining a Strategic Decision 19
2- The Necessity of Strategic Management . . 20
C. STRATEGIC DECISICN PROCESS 21
1. The Nature of Strategic Decision
Process 21
2. The Decision Process Model 22
r. THE EERSflCTIVES CF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT . . 24
III. ICGISTICS AND ICGISTICS MANAGEMENT 26
A. THE ORIGIN OF THE RORD LOGISTICS 26
E. MILITARY ICGISTICS 27
1. The Eiiclutioo of the Concept of
Military Logistics 27
2- The Ccncept of Military Logistics .... 30
C- BUSINESS ICGISTICS 37
1. Domestic Business Logistics 38
2. ~ Icterrational Lcgistics .,..42
r. INTEGRATil LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS) 46
1. Lcgistics System Concept ..... .... 47
2. The Irt€grat€d logistics Support (IIS)
Id Th€ Military field 49
3- Integrated Distritution Management in
Business Field 50
IV. SIBAIEGY AND ICGISTICS 56
£, THE BEIAIIONSHIPS BETWEEN SIflAIEGY AND
LOGI£TIC£ 56
E. THE IMPACIS OF lOGISIICS ON STfiATEGY .... 58
1. logistics Detemines Military
Capability , 59
2. Logistics Deteriines Tactics ..59
3. Logistics Determines Strategy 60
C. LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY FLEXIBIIITY 62
£. THE BOLE CF COMMANI AND ITS STAFF 63
1. The ficie of CcjDitander ....64
2. The fiesponsitilities of Staffs 65
V, LOGISTICS STfiATEGY FOB fiOK MILITABY FOBCES .... 68
A. THE BELAlIONSHIf S EFTNEEN BOK AND THE
O.S 68
E. THE BEALIIIES OF KCBEAN PENINSULA 73
1. North Korean Military Force Build-up ... 73
2. BOK ard North Korea Force Comparison ... 74
3. Expected nar Scenario and Operational
Imperatives for BOK 77
C. DEFENSE STfiATEGY OF O.S. IN BEIATION TO
KOBEA 80
£- LOGISTICS STRATEGY FOB BOK DEFENSE 83
1. The Pictlems of ROK Military Logistics . . 83
2. Alternatives to Solve the Problems .... 87
3. "Analysis 88
4. Logistics Strategy for The ROK
Hilitaiy Forces 93
VI. CCNCIOSION AN! EECOMflENEATIONS 107
IISI CI EEFEEENCiS 110
EIBIICGBAfBi 112
INIIIAl ri51iiIB0II0N IIST 113
LIST OF TABLES
I. Ictal Distritution Mission of a firm 55
II. Estiiiated Casualties of T-he Korean War 69
III. North Korean Ground Forces (1970 - 1980) 74
IV. BCK and North Korea Force Comparison (1980) ... 75
V. Periods of Military Service 76
LIST CF flGOBES
i.1 Strategic Decision ilaJtiny and Problem
Solving 22
2.2 lie Basic Phases of the Decision Process - ... 23
3.1 Ihe Business logistics Concept 45
3.2 The International logistics Concept 46
3.3 Integrated logistics Support Plan (IlSP) .... 51
4-1 Erief Descriftion of Military Factors 57
4.2 Nature of Military Strategy 58
4.3 Ihe Basis fcr Plans and Logistics 65
4.4 Ihe Staff fiesponsihilities 66
5.1 logistics Flcu 97

I. INIECEOCIIOM
IE aEaljziBg any subject, it may be desirable tc reduce
it tc sinijle terms ard to shew them ic logical relaticn-
shifs. In attemptirg to do this, it is inevitable that
stateients vill be nade which appear obvious or trite and
even repetitious tc those who are experienced in the
speciiic subject. If we are to properly communicate our
thoughts on strategy and logistics, and we propose tc manage
it as a part of any organization (military, governnert,
business firm) , then we ought to agree on some basic urder-
standing of the cooccft.
Ccnsiderable time and effort have been devoted toward
the d€velcpneat cf cr€dible strategic and tactical dcctrices
to defend cur natioral interests. Various strategies are
continually under review to find better methcds of
projectirg ailitary fewer- But through this process logis-
tics ias Icng been relegated to a category of secerdary
importance. In many cases, the crucial logistical implica-
tions of current strategies and tactics are net even
addressed, auch less investigated and resolved. A review of
historical and current logistical realities, and their
impacts en strategy and tactics will reinforce the critical
necessity fcr us to ejtamine logistical implications early in
any strategic or tactical considerations or planning.
Ihis thesis research is based on secondary data, i.e.,
based en published definiticrs and explanations of the
concept ef strategy and logistics, and the relatienships
between thea. ~ The purpose of this thesis research is to
study the concept ef strategy/strategic management and
logistics/lcgistics nanagement ef both of the military and
business fields, and to investigate the relatienships
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tetw€€D ttilitarj strategy and logistics, and finallj to
recomiend a logistics strategy for the defense of the
Beputlic Cf Korea (ECK)
.
Chapter two deals «ith the origin of the strategy and
its ccDC€pt of toth ttilitary and business fields. It also
descrites the strategic manageinent, strategic decision
process, and perspectives of the strategic managemect of
tusircss fields.
Chapter three ccccerns vith the origin of the wcrd
"logistics", the corcept of military and business logistics
separately, and with the integrated logistics support (ILS)
.
Chapter four describes the relationships between IcgiS'
tics and strategy of nilitary fields, and logistics impacts
en strategy and tactics.
Chcpter five reccumends sone logistics strategy for the
defense of the fiOK after investigating the relationships
between the U.S. and EOK, realities on Korean Peninsula, and
the O.S. defense strategy in relation to ROK and its allies.
Ihe author gratefully acknowledges the direction and
guidance of his adviser. Professor H. G. Sovereign, and his
second reader. Professor fioger Evered in completing this
thesis. In particular, the author is very grateful tc the
colleagues and others for their helpful advice, criticisms,
and eccouragement.
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II- SIBATJCI AND SIEAIEGIC MANAGEMENT
A. Ill CCBCEPI OF SIEATEGI
E€C€EtIy, interest in strategic management has grcwn
rapidlj in the fields of business and military. This
interest in the topic reflects its importance despite the
conceptual confusion associated with the concept of
strategy.
»
Ecger Evereds eiphasized the importance of the ccncept
of strategy by the fclloving sentences ;
The ccncept of strategy is central to the policy and
managerial sciences. The quality of policy research hill
be influenced significantly by the care ue take with
conceptual clarity, particularly with regard to the
praxies of strategic management. The rush to guantify
and to apply advanced statistical inference techniques
is rot Jixely to prove fruitful for the field of stra-
tegic sanagement, unless prior care is taken vith the
concepts, constructs ana theoretical orientation
£B€f, !]•
Significant literatures on the concept of strategy have
leen developed in a number of fields, mostly in the fields
cf business management and silitary practice. However, the
existing management literature on strategy is confusing
because cf the diversity of its meanings £Bef. 1]. Mere
specifically, alternative meanings are;
(1). efficient task execution, (2). methods for achieving
objectives, (3) • overall mission^ (4) . a system cf ends-
means relationships, (5). the process of selecting
i!!cst cf the ccncept of strategy are from the article
£Bef, 1],
2Ecger Evered is a Professor of management in the
Admiristrative Science Department of the Naval Postgraduate
School at Mcnterey, California.
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cbj6Ctiw€s and missicrs, (6). tiie act of appreciatirg the
€iivircj]iDeiit, (7). oux core existeDtial choices £fief. 2]-
1 . lie Ori qlji oi the C cnc€£t of Strategy
Cost words ha«e a uuique origin, and strat€g;y is not
ejccepticr. The word strateg;^ comes to us from the Greek
kord "Strategos" , vhich means a general in command cf an
army (stxategos, aray agein, to lead) , 3 Most early Greek
states after 550 BC had a "strategos", or general officer of
the army. Criginally, he was a military official, but later
acquired increasing administrative, civil and political
functions, to become an important state officer. In 500 BC
a "strategia", or board of 10 generals was set up in Athens,
as a way cf coordinating 10 tribal units and diffusing
power. lie 10 "stratecos" that made up the "strategia" toard
were for several hundred years essentially the governors or
CEOs cf a region. The "strategia" was not, however, a board
in the mcdern sense; there was no collective responsibility
and no unacimous policy. From 509 BC to 490 BC, Athens
confronted a wide spread revolutionary atmosphere, a crisis
cf the fern of goverrance (denocracy vs rule by council vs
rule by strong aristocrats) , and a crisis of foreigr policy
(relaticns with Persia, Sparta and Ionia) . During the 5th
century EC, the powers of "strategia" were considerably
increased by political functions, especially in foreign
affairs. Ite chief cf "strategia" was at once the commander
of the Army, the head of the state, the president cf the
federal assemblies and foreign minister £Bef. 1].
Ihe evolution of the idea of strategy was ;
Strategos refered to a role (a general in command of an
army), later it cane to mean 'the art of the general',
which is to say the psychological and behavioral skills
3See Webster's Kew World Dictionary, Collins Korld
fublishirg Company, ii. 424, 1S74-
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vith vhich he cccuci€d the role. By the time of fericles
(45C EC) it caiae tc meaE managerial skill (administra-
ticL, leadership, cratioii/ power). And by Alexandei's
tine (330 BC) it referred to the sJcill of emplcying
forces tc overcome cppositicn, and to create a uniriea
system of global gcvernance- Pericles provides a fine
exaiple cf strategy in the political and the state
managenent sense, and Alexander provides the ultimate
exanple cf strategy in the ailitary sense £Ee£- 1].
It is meaningful tc compare the situations between
Greek anc current situations whether it is of business or
ffilitary- The Greek states are analogous to corpcraticns
that crganize themselves in a variety of ways, that compete,
that fcrm ccalitiocs, that must deal with massive environ-
mental threats (Persian invasions) and opportunities
(creatine a unified wcrld) £fiei. 1J«
2. 3h€ Concept cf Strategy in Military Fiel d
lie history cf military strategy is long, and it has
been krittei by numerous authors and strategists. Bocer
Ivered stated that tlie first recorded statement on silitary
strategy is that by £un Tzu, written in China around 360 £C,
and new entitled, "Tie Art cf War"* £Bef. 1].
respite the scope of the military strategy litera-
ture tiere is still ro agreed definition of the precise
seaning cf the term strategy (as in the corporate field).
The term strategy first gained currency in Europe during the
time cf the Napcleoric wars. Prior to this time the term
"strategem" was used (since about AD 1500) to denote a trick
by a general designed to outwit or surprise an enemy. After
the ^apclecnic period, strategy referred to the art of
projectirg and directing the extensive military operations
cf campaign, which might be a sequence of battles.
Clausewitz' de'fines strategy in this post - Napoleonic sense
Izu, Sun, The Art of War, Oxford (1963).
«£. fl. Earle, Makers cf M oder n St rategy , Prirceton
(194^).
14
; Stiatcgy is the art of the employment of battles to gain
the cl::^€Ctive of war- In ether words, strategy fcrms the
flan cf the war, Jiakes out the proposed courses of the
different campaigns iihicii compose the war, and results in
the tattles to be fought in each. Clausewitz devotes much of
his writings to arguirg that war is both a social and pclit-
ical act, tut also a real pcliticaJ. instrument, a continua-
tion cf pclicy carried out by other means . For Clausewitz,
the aim cf strategy is the destruction of the enemy forces
en the battle fields [Bef. 1].
Kith the grcwing complexity and interconnectedness
cf sccieties, technclogy and warfare, nations fcund it
necessary to manage their policies through political,
econciic, technological, psychological and even religicus
factors, aleng with the purely military component- The broa-
dening cf the instruments of conflict combined with the
blurring of distinctions between military and nonmilitary
and between war and peace, led to the appearance of the term
"grand strategy" or ("total strategy" or "higher strategy").
Grand strategy meant the art cf employing all the rescurces
of a nation (or coalition of nations) to achieve policy
objectives £Ref. 1].
Ihe distincticn between strategy and tactics is also
somewhat blurred. The traditional distinction is that
strategy deal with dejloyment, over wide spaces, long times
and large uovements, and before contact with the enemy ;
tactics deal with actions en the battle field itself,
ficginsky* defines strategy as the comprehensive direction of
power, and tactics as the i amediate application of power - a
distirction which is not limited to the military area.
liddel-Hart^ states that tactics lies in the province of
Nava
*£ee H. fioginsJiy, The Develop ment of Naval Ihcught,
1 War Cclleql Preis 1-977. ^ —
7£ee E. H. Lidddel-Hart, Strategy, Praeger, New XcrJc,
1968.
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fighting. Strategy ret only stops on the frontier, tut has
its foifcse the reduction of the fighting to the slenderest
possitle prcfortions £fief. 1].
fioger Evered takes the conception of strategy from
liddel-flart for tie strategy in the military field.
liddel-Hart defines strategy as " the art of distrituting
and applying military means to fulfill the ends cf policy."
liddel-Haxt distingoished strategy (pure, or military,
strategy) from grand strategy (higher or total strategy) as
follciis ;" the tern 'strategy' is best confined tc its
literal Hearing cf •generalship* - the actual dixecticn of
nilitary force, as distinct from the policy governing its
emplcynert and combining it with other weapons ; eccncmic,
political, psychological." Such policy is in application a
higher level strategy, for which the term "grand strategy"
has teen coined [fief. 1 ]• For more Liddel-Hart* s conception
of strategy such as direct and indirect approach^ see
£Be£, 1].
Ihexe are twc ether uses of the term strategy ir the
ailitary. Ihe first has to de with "force acguisitien" or
new nilitary force. Ihe traditional meaning of strategy has
to do with deployment and uses of forces. Throughout the
preseit-cay defense establishment, however, strategy is used
to denote the acguisition of new weapons and technologies to
deal with the "threat" that is presumed because the Soviet
Union has acquired new weapons or technologies [fief. 1].
Cne pregnant ccaparison by Roger Evered is the analogy it
represents to competitive business strategy. A competitor is
found to have or to te working on, a new product that has
significantly increased capability. This is seen as a
threat tc the firm, since market share may be lost and
growth nay suffer if the threat isn*t responded to. The firm
16
€valuat€£ the sitcation and selects its respcDse in
accorcance fcith a strategy. Ihe second other military use
cf the ten strategy tas arisen since the strategic tcmbing
cf UHII, Ihe use of military force against the ncnitilitary
aspects cf enemy - industry, raw material, population. . .etc.
- is cften called strategic. The advent of nuclear weapons
,
carried ly submarines, aircraft or missiles, has ircreased
the use cf the term "strategic" in this sense, almost tc the
fcint *i€re "strategic" and "nuclear weapons" are synony-
mous. Hhat is really implied, however, is that nuclear
weapcns are being csed as instruments of threat tc the
enemy's rcnsilitary components £Be£. 1 ]•
Ecger Evered stated that both these extended mean-
ings cf strategy - force acquisition and threat to the
enemy's resources - are compatible with the Liddel-Hart's
concepticn cf strategy. They are both examples of the indi-
rect appioacii by which military forces are being used pcten-.
tially to gain naticnal advantage without direct use in
battle. Military forces are used to modify the psycholog-
ical experiences of the enemy in order to destroy his
purpose, rather than destroy its assets. In short, strategy
is viewed as the art of winning protracted struggle hetween
enemies [fief. 1 ]•
^- IhS Concept of S tra tegy in Business Manaqemert
Ihe major purpose of the clarification of the
concept of business strategy is to give the CEO or president
or general manager cf a firm an active management approach
which embraces the point of view of the CEO and the perspec-
tive of the total organization. Andrews^ defined strategy
for tie corporate business as:
8K. E. Andrew:?, Ihe Concept of Corpora te Strategy^
Irwin, Homewood, Illi£os5-T19Bt5rT~^
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Corporate strategy is the cattern of decisions in a
conifanj that deteimines ana reveals its ohjectivcs,
purposes cr goals, produces the principal policies and
plans for achieving those goals, and defines the range
of business the ccmpany is to pursue, the kind of
eccEcaic and human crganizaticn it is or intends to te,
and th^ nature of the econcmic and noneconomic contritu-
ticE it tends tc make to its shareholders, and
emplcyees, custoaexs and cciuaunities.
Ihe concept of strategy guoted above reveals a
respect for the CEO cr general manager of a firm. Andrews'
concept cf strategy is dominated by the determination of
corpcrate purpose of economic, human and social teras, and
ty consideration of the future character of the firm in
relation tc opporturities, threats and constraints. Ihe
highest fuxction of the CEO is the management of the future-
oriented purposeful development of the enterprise. Ihe
folic; p£ol:lems of business, like those of policy in public
affairs, have tc do kith the choice of purposes, the melding
cf ccrpoxate identity and character, the unending defirition
of what needs to be dene, and the mobilization of resources
for the attainment ci goals in the face of aggressive ccmpe-
titicn or adverse cixcumstances £fief. 1].
Cne more vieu of strategy by Andrews is the prccess
vieu, i.e., strategy is vieued more as a fluid to be vcrked
Kith than a thing to te actualized. Andrews' conception of
strategy is described as "an organizational process fcrever
in metier" and as tie interface between the organizational
process of formulaticn and the organizational process of
implementation. And the determination of the purpose is in
reality ir dynamic interrelation with its implementation
£fief- 1].
In general terms, strategy in the corporate manage-
ment field is seen as a process for generating viable
IS
directiors that lead to satisfactory performance in the
narJcet flace, given a variety of constraints and the exis-
tence cf ccitpetitions £Bef. 1]-
£. SlBklEGlC HANAG£f£IT IN BOSIHESS FIELDS
Strategic managenient has becoie a popular phrase as CEOs
struggle tc cope with the ccoplexities of world eccncmic,
political ard industiial situations in the 80s [fief. 4].
1 • ref inin g a Strategi c Decision
It is an imfcrtant factor for the CEOs to specify
the differences Jsetween strategic decision and tactical
decisicr. lactical decision naking may lead to efficient
cperaticns, but strategic decision-maXing is necessary to
assure that an organization achieves long-term success in
varying situations. Strategic decisions involve the deter-
oination cf the basic long term goals and objectives cf an
organizaticn, the adcption cf courses of action, and the
allocaticn of the resources necessary for realizing the
goals. Ihe adoption cf courses of acticn and the allocation
cf resources involve all phases of long range planning
£Hef, 3].
George H. Rice Jr. stated that most of the litera-
tures en business policy and strategy argues that strategic
•decisio£s9
1. Have a significant effect on the overall ccipany
operation, rather than having an effect confined tc a
single portion of the ccmpany.
2. Have a relatively long - term effect (e.g. ; prcduct
life cycle) rather than a short term effect.
«• Fcr iiore detail related literatures, see [fief. 3 cp,
62 fcctncte 8. ]•
IS
3, E€il€Ct an attempt by the CEO of the company to
achieve major company goals and ohjective.
Eic€ further stated that the third of this criteria
is the mcst important. The fact that a decision has a long-
term impact on the ccmpany is net so definitive as is the
fact that a manager made the decision deliberately in crder
to achieve a long-term goal/ or to build and shape the
company to meet anticipated future demands to be made en it
£fief. 3].
2. Ihe Necessity of Strategic Management
SciE€times the lack cf concern with strategic manage-
ment is attributed tc ignorance about the alternative cppcr-
tunities, cr attributed to the inability of management to
exercise sophisticated analysis.
Ibe systematic strategic management concepts were
not accepted by the private sector (if they were accepted,
it was very few) . Sirce the Industrial Revolution, the world
has net lacked for industrial leaders who are men of initia-
tive, vision, and inventiveness. Infallible intuition
guided tleir fortunes successfully. Even though part of the
success was luck, these individuals did not see the need for
formalized strategic management. Rapid growing eccncmy
always has room in the market place, our rapid expanding
industrial tase did net reguire extensive planning because
epportunities were there. As the corporate world became mere
complex, crowded, mature, and offered fewer opportunities,
strategy become more important [fief. 4].
loday, however, the corporate environment denands
that attention be placed on strategic management. New tech-
niques have opened nek markets, i.e., health care , communi-
cations, automation, information services, and many
electronic advances- Many factors complicate the aarket
place ; new jet age ; the energy crunch ; the growth of
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larg€ diversified firms ; growtii of the world market vs
regional market flace ; new marketing tools and techniques
(e.g.; 3-V., Automated phone messages) ; consolidation of
elder, ttore mature industries such as the auto industry ;
rapid expansion of new and embryonic business such as the
computer industry, electronics, and avionics ; the informa-
tion ejcpansion ; and industrial automation. The inpact of
any one of these elements or a business has been and can be
dramatic and dynamic- These conditions make it necessary
for the CEO to focus en the business he/she is in, the envi-
ronment of the business, the strategic characteristics, and
their relative competitive position £Bef. 4].
C. £afiAl£GIC DECISICfi fBOCESS
Today the corporate environment demands that attention
fe placed en strategic management. For strategic manage-
ment, there should be certain decision processes. Strategy
has unigue characteristics which should be considered before
saking strategic decisions.
1 . Ihe Nat ure of Strat egic Decision Process
Strategic decision- making deals with the uncertainty
and risk of a rapidly changing and complex environment. Ihe
unigue nature of strategic decision making in contrast to
other kinds of decision making, is that it must continuously
deal with the unfamiliar and the unknown in addition to the
familiar and known. The strategic manager must deal with
continuously different situations for which there are no
formulas, ncdels, programs or deriveable solutions ££ef. 2].
It is meaningful to distinguish the differences
tetween strategic decision saking and problem solving,
because tbere usually is some confusion in using the term
"decisior making" and " problem solving". Familiarity with
SIBAIIGIC DECISIOK MAKING
Eartial visioD cf an
"uDf aiiliar" tctal
situation (perscn *

















Iigui€ 2.1 Strategic Oecisico flaJcing and Problea Solving,
a situation implies a non- strategic problem, A problem is
defined, a logical sethod is applied, and a rational sclu-
tion is liorked out vhich is subseguently implemented with a
control procedure. In strategic decision making, there is no
cne mettcd for hacdling the problems, because it basn*t
arisen before or its precise nature are complex [£ef« 2].
Ihe major distinctions^o are presented in figure 2-1.
2. Ihe Decision I rocess M ode l
Any kind of decision-making follows certain phases,
but there exists no perfect model vhich can deal with all
kinds of decision making. A generalized decision process
model, as shown in figure 2.2, implies that all decisions go
systeaatically through certain phases. ii Using the figure
2.2, the first and second phases should be strategic marage-
ment, and we can see the difference between strategic
manageient and' operational management. Ihe strategic
icfigure 2.1 is reproduced from £ Bef • 2 PP. 127].
i^Figure 2.2 is reproduced from £Hef. 2 pp. 129].
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5. Select a plan tc follcu-






Pigare 2.2 the Basic Phases o£ the Decision Process.
decision process iirings into play the more qualitative,
tacit, and intuitive powers of the human kinds, in addition
to its rational, logical and quantitative powers. The £tra~
tegic decision maJcer uust take in and make sense of as much
cf the environment as he can. He must sense, perceive, judge
and comprehend a wide range cf factors and qualities in a
specific concrete situation. He must synthesize and balance
the rich ccmplez of interdependent forces, factors and
features. And he mcst select an action or activity which
will ocdify or unbalance the situation in some preferred way
[fief. 2]. For more strategic decision process in open
system, change, individual styles, organization, see [fief. 2
pp, li1 - 136].
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E. Ill IEB£PECTI?ES CF STRATEGIC MAHAGEMENT
A recent study [ B€£. 5] reveals that companies recognize
that their jroblems^ challenges, current efforts, and rcom
for f regress don't lie priaarily in the area of strategic
decision maJiing, but in three other related areas ; struc-
ture, flanning process, people and style-
Ihe study results are;
1- All companies sampled are changing their orgari-
zational structure to get better mileage cut of
their strategic thinking. They feel that their
current structure, five or ten years old, is not
capable of producing the type of strategic deci-
sions that are dictated by the slow growth envi-
ronment, the new challenge of technology, or
glcbal competition.
2. Also coupanies are struggling with improving or
mcdifyirg their strategic planning process tc get
better strategic decisions. Overall they feel
that the way in which the strategic decisions are
made is a crucial process to manage in order tc
get the prefer decisions. As a result, many
companies are changing their strategic planning
cycles and systems or the location of the planner
to get new, different, or better strategic deci-
sions.
3. Finally, and without exception, all ccmpanies
shculd realize that ,in fact, good strategic
decisions and plans will only occur thanks tc
right mctivating themes encouraged by the chief
executive and to people who have rnternalized
strategic thinJcing. People's behavior, judgement-
and past experience and the CEO»s style very much
influence tie quality and type of strategic deci-
sion made ££€£. 5].
Ihese study results are only from large business compa-
nies, i:ut we can thiik them in connection with some ailitary
fields alsc. In otter words, some military may need new
structure tc get better strategic decisions, need proper
strategic planning process, and need right nilitary
personnel who can thirk strategically.
Eecause of the uxcertainties of the future, strategy
formulation is extremely difficult without exact forecasting
cf the future situations and environments. In current
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situaticcS/ high technology and competition, manager of
tusincss field should think of strategic management ret orly
as making strategic decisions, t)ut also as composed of four
strategic managenent components, i.e., decisions, structure,
planning process, people and style £fief. 5], For example,
sanager should ask fcllouing guestions;
1. Htich structure will test channel strategic deci-
sions? Eoes the current structure and information
system help strategic decisions?
2. Lc the people have the experience and capatilities
fcr strategic thinkirg?
Ic improve strategic juanagement, either business or
oilitary, the follcving areas should he considered and
researched.
1. Structural change; reorganization of current ccctiol
ard infornaticr systems ( HIS subsystems) aimed at
strategic matters.
2. feople selection and training; select right people
and train then to think strategically.
3. Further research is required in strategic planning
systems and their impacts on decisions.
lor mere isplications for management, see [fief. 5 fF. 29 -
^2].
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III. ICGISaiCS AMD LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
A. lEE CfilGIH Of TH£ NOfiD lOGISTICS
Althcugij many eficxts has teen made to define precisely
the ccDC€pt£ of logistics, there remain today many shad€s of
iieanlng for this term. It is important to understand
preciselj what the concept encompasses in order that flan-
ning ard cosmunicatici may be facilitated [fief. 6]. Graham
fi. Bider^ CSAF, investigated the origin of the word "Icgis-
tics" in his article [Befo 6]. It might he meaningful to
examine the origin of the word "logistics", even though it
was irvestisated by Eider earlier. 12
In the beginning there were tvo words, "LogistiXos" and
"logisticus". The first is Greek, the second is Latin, and
they tcth had the sase meaning - calculation or reascnicg in
a mathematical sense. At some later time the word tcck on a
second meaning, so that today "logistics" in current usage
can take either one cf two totally different definitions.
Ihe first meaning , to reason mathematically, has remained
constant fcr centuries. We can trace the second seaning of
logistics lack to seme obscure early usage of the latin
root, log-. Lathaiiis states that "logluguea", a ncun
meaning lodge or hut, appeared in records dated 1350 ; and
"logic", a verb meaning to lodge or dwell, appeared in 1360.
He attritutes the French verb, "loger", meaning "to ledge"
to this latin antecedent, and we might note that the root's
usage is current. Tie French verb "loger" leads us directly
to the second meaning of logistics. As civilized societies
i2ijc£t of the cortents cf the origin of the word "logis-
tics" ccne directly ficm [Bef. 6 pp. 25].
i3Ecnald E. Latham, Revised Medieval L ati n Word list,
londcn, Oxford University Press7~PP~7'STJ~=~"28T7~T"?65T
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grew cut of the Hedieial Age and began to acguire scphisti-
caticD, £c too did tie nature of the warfare in which these
societies engaged. Armies grew in size, and the prohleas of
administering them also grew- Sometime near the year 1670 an
adviser to the French King, louis XIV, proposed a solution
for th€S€ nilitary pichlems in the form of new staff struc-
ture for the army. Cne of the newly created positions was
that cf Harechal General des logis, whose title came fiom
the vert "loger". This officer was responsible for planning
marches, selecting canps, and regulating transportation and
supply. * Ihis iistarce appears as the first application of
the ocv leasing of Icgistics and first organizaticnal usage
cf Icgistics as we recognize it today £fief. 6].
£. flIIIlA£I LOGISTICS
^m The Evolution of the Ccrcept of Military Logistics
In many writings, the evolution of concept cf mili-
tary logistics is described, tut LuJcert Jr. arranged it
systeaatically by time and ccntents [fief. 7]. The first
serious attempt at a definition of logistics was made in
1838 when Baron Antcine Henry Jomini divide the art of war
into five separate and distinct parts - strategy, grand
tactics, Icgistics, engineering, and minor tactics. To
Jcmini, logistics enccmpassed all military activities except
those of actual comtat and planning of that comtat.^s ihe
word logistics vas little used until Captain Alfred I. Cahan
intrcduced it into U.S. naval usage near the end of the 19th
century. Mahan's impact on military thought is unguestioned
i*Jaiies D. Hittle, The Milit ary Sta ff, Its Histcry and
£evelc£m€nt, Harrisburg,"3racRpoIe, PP~tI"8~-4 97~H97''T5^1
i-Botert D. H^inl, Jr.- Dictionar y of Military and NavalQuestions, Anapolis; t.S. Sa^ai insiltutS,~T56B7""EPT"i7*T
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and bis ttiitings revitalized and enlarged Jonini's ccDce^ts
£Be£. 7].
ilthough military flacners continued to reccgnize
the necessity for tie broad-tased industrial and eccroiric
support envisioned by Mahan, official definitions of logis-
tics renained sketcij until the term came into vogue in
k'HII, Drtil WWII, logistics was described only the tradi-
tionally narrow functions of aovement and supply which char-
acterized its usage through the period. Since WWII, the
trend in official definitions has been toward a gradual
videning of the functions included in the generic field of
military logistics. But the economic and mobilization
aspects of logistics, envisioned by Mahan, have yet to gain
official sanction or to be included in any official defini-
tions of the tern [Bef. ?]• At the time of 1974, the offi-
cial dictionary of tie DOD still reads ;
Logistics ; The science of planning and carrying out the
movement and maintenance of forces. In its most compre-
hensive sense, these aspects of military operations
vhich deal vitn ; (1) desxgn and development, acguisi-
ticn, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance,
evacuaticr, and disposition of material ; (2) movemect,
evacuation and hospitalization of personnel ; (3) acgui-
siticn cf construction, maintenance, operation and
dispositicn of facilities ; and {4} acguisiticn or
furnishing of services. **
Ihere is soie evidence that the term logistics is
again being utilized to encompass many of the national and
international aspects envisicned by Jomini and Mahan.
ferhaps even of more importance is the continuing reccgni-
tion cf the interdependence of strategy, logistics, and
national security. Ihese trends can be traced by *'!Ihe
Ceaninc cf -Logistics" written after WWII, by Duncan
Eallartire. For it is in his discussions that we see the
i«0-£. Joint Chief of Staff, Dictionary of U.S. Hilitarj
lerms fcr Joint Dsaqe, JCS fub. i, wasHington, U.ST" CoTT
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first €iDfiiasis oc deiining logistics as including all these
froc€££€S critical to tie development of a cation's
strategy. Eallantine provides one of the first troad-tased
deficiticns of the term, when notes that; ... Icgistics
signifies the total process ty which the resources cf a
catici - material and human - are mobilized and directed
toward the accomplishment of military ends.... Ercadly
conceived, the logistics process is thus the means where by
the raw war-making capacity of the nation is transfcrsed
into instrusents of fcrce ready to be employed in pursuit of
strategic or tactical objectives. ^^ Duncan Ballantine also
develcped a theory which credited logistics as the "bridge"
between the two elements necessary for a nation to success-
fully wage war - its lilitary forces and its economic capa-
bilities £B€f. 7].
fienry £. Eccles has extended Ballantine* s theories.
Be has ccnstantly fought for the acceptance and legitiniza-.
tion cf logistics as the key-stone of a bridge between the
raticn*s wai potential and the forces it fields for battle.
Eccles points out that the industrial capacity of a nation
limits tie creation cf combat forces while the emplcyment of
those forces is limited by the military commander's logis-
tics restraints. *«
In 1977, Colonel Edward P. Lukert, Jr. USA has troa-
cenec and separated tie term logistics frcm its traditioral
ailitary and wartime ccnnctation - Logistics and as its
subsets strategic logistics and operational Icgistics
£fief. 7].
i"'£uncan S. Ballantine, D.S. Naval lo gist ics in the
cecond Hcrld War, Prarceton uni"7eTsit7~PTesS7 PP . "17 lyTIS":
Sept., 1S68.
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2 • JiJ Concept ci Mili tary logistics
As cne can £€e in the evolution of the conceft of
ailitaiy logistics, since WWII, the importance of logistics
has hcen stressed at all levels of military activities, and
military writers have teen stressed its various aspects at
length. Even though we understand logistics better than
tefore the nar, we still have many deficiencies in the field
cf logistics plan and capabilities. Among the obstacles to
improvement are the uncertainties that exist as to the
Eeaning cf the word itself and as to the proper place of
logistics in military organizations and plans- This is
iecause logistics has several distinct aspects and in each
aspects tie defiriticrs and descriptions differ. Frequently,
therefore, people may be talking from diverse points of view
withcut realizing the effect this has on their descriptions
and cfinicns. Each will be ascribing a different neaniig to
the word without realizing it. There exist many writings
which define the logistics concept in the military field.
Among them Eccles defines Icgistics in comparative term with
ether art or science - pure logistics and applied logistics.
Grahajt i. Hidei presents a cumulative approach in his
article £fief. 6].
Graham W. Elder defined logistics at three levels,
i.e., sccic-economic function, system process, work-
functicral levels. Bis definition of military logistics is
as fellow;
Military logis tics : The social and economic function of
FEysIcal Supply ard Physical Distribution that creates
tiie and place value for military goods and services. As
a nilitary organizational system^ the purpose of logis-
tics is .accomplished through the processes of
Bequirements Detemination, Acquisition, Distributicn,
and Ccnservaticn. Ihe organizational work-functicns or
physical tasks that must be performed to accomplish the
§urpcse of military logistics are Traffic Management,
^rliy« Maintenance, and Facilities Engineering£B€i. e].
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Eider commeiited atout his definition of nilitary
logistics as follow;
At the socio-economic Jevel, the overall purpose of
logistics is to create time and place utility, or value, in
goods and services. In practical terms, logistics is the
Eusiness of getting the right thing to the right place at
the right time. This generally taxes place in tuo stages,
i.e., we acquire it frcm a manufacturer and then we
distribute it to a user. This two step function, sometimes
called producer logistics and consumer logistics, is best
descriled as physical supply ard physical distributicn.
Ihe system tiocesses describe a series of action
taJcen to accomplish the overall purpose of logistics. They
illustrate the fact that, although logistics can be
described as a two-step functicn in socio-economic terms, in
fact logistics is a continuous closed system in the military
crganizaticr. Given a operational need, logistics translates
the need into specific requirement, ac^uxre the gccds and
services sc specifies, distiibutes them, and conserves them
through such actions as protective storage and maintenance.
Conservation also includes disposal so that when an item is
no longer needed it can be removed from inventory and a new
reguirement determined.
At the work-function level- the terms used to
describe the actual jcbs that a logistic organization should
do. Ihey explain in practical terms the system processes of
logistics - these are the jobs that must he done to get the
right thing to the right place at the right time. The jcbs
should be readily recognizable [Bef. 6].
1. Eccles defined lilitary logistics in twc ways -
pure logistics and applied logistics. He stated that the
word logistics is an abstract term which represents a very
practical reality; ir its abstract sense it, like strategy,
tactics, economics, and politics, is not susceptible to a
single and permanent definition; rather it can be descrited
in a variety of ways in very general terms; if it is to be
understood, it must be approached from various points of
view, acd it mast discussed and described by reference to
ether intangibles and abstract terms; it is only through the
consideration of one abstract term with relation to the
other abstract terms with which it is naturally associated
that the true picture can be developed and described.
Be also stated that
;
Pure logistics is nerely a scientific inguiry into the
theory of logistics - its scope and function in the
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sci€J]C€ cf war, with a broad outline of its
orqaEi2ation. Apciied logistics rests upon the pure,
ana ccrcerns itself, in acccrdance with general princi-
Sl€£, with d€tail€d manner of dividing labor in theogistical field in the preparation of war during its
duration [Bef. 8 ]•
a. Pure Logistics
Eccles defined pure logistics by using the
following three descriptions of abstract logistics;
1. Lcgistics is all that part of the war which is not
included in strategy and tactics.
2. Strategy and tactics provided the scheme for the
conduct of military operations ; logistics provides
the leans therefore.
3m Ihe logistics process is, at one and the same time,
tie military element in the nation's econosy and the
econcmic elemert in its military operations [fief. 8]..
From above descriptions, he saw war itself in
its atstiact sense as comprising three interlocked abstrac-
tions - strategy, tactics, and logistics.
Based on history, we find that war is a matter
of infiiitive variation, in which no two situations are
precisely the same, and that in all war situations the
actions and decisions are based upon a blend of strategical,
tactical, and logistical considerations. If we consider
these abstract terms as three overlapping disks, we can see
where seme sitcaticrs involve all three considerations,
ethers involve two, and some only one. However, as we study,
we realize that the dividing lines tend to blur and in some
cases to vanish. A somewhat different approach would be to
say that, in 'its abstract sense, war is a combicaticn of
military, pclitical, economic, and geographic situations and
considerations. Here again we find a variable blend of
abstract terms, each of which is subject to a variety of
neaniEgs £Eef. 8]« One aore view of pure logistics by
Eccl€£ is the relationship between military and econonic
conditicrs.
In crdex to fight modern kar, we must mobilize cur
eccncaic and industrial resources in order to create and
sufxort the necessary combat forces and to maintain cur
civil eccnomy and tealth. Civil logistics is the lobili-
zaticn cf men and materials and the renderiig of
services, to the operating military forces £Re£. 8].
From th€ description that "logistics provides
the means fcr the corduct of oilitary operations" and ether
statesents above, Eccles has placed logistics on a coegual
level with strategy and tactics, thus forming the three
major snbdivisicns cf the art and science of war, and
defined logistics by a relatively simple and broad abstract
level using simple terms - terms that can be readily related
and are adeguate to ccver the major problems of war. In
general tens, pure logistics is an abstract term used to
indicate the whole cciplex process whereby the means of war
necessary to support a national strategy are deteriined,
procured, and finally distributed to the combat commanders
£fief. 8].
1. Applied logistics
Eccles emphasized the importance of applied
logistics as follow;
Abstract speculaticrs, theories, and principles have
never prepared a ratxon to fight and have never won a
war. All they have done is to enable man to understand
his war problems and to assist him to solve them. In
order to prepare fcr war, we must define the practical
tasks of the armed forces and we must assign these
tasks to specific crganizaticns and individuals. for
this purpose we have organized the DOO and the aried
forces, and authoritative definitions have been
published and specific tasks assigned [Bef. 8].
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Eccl€s ccDsidered applied logistics largely in
two l€V€ls - international and national levels (mobilization
logistics), and operational logistics. In the practical
field, the definiticr of applied logistics varies in accor-
cance with the le'vel of the organization being considered.
Eut always nilitary logistics is concerned with "furnishing
the oeans cf war", which are material, men, facilities, and
services. Applied logistics represents the everyday prac-
tical application of this abstract process. The objective
cf all Icgistic effort is the creation and sustained suppcrt
cf adeguate coml)at forces. Economy is an essential function
in the attainment of this objective. The applied logistics
process of providing men, material, facilities, and
services, comprises the performance of many specialized and
technical functions. These functions include ship and
aircraft design, construction, maintenance, and repair ; air
and naval base design, construction, and operation ; the
operaticn of an intricate supply system ; the provision of
fuel, ordnance, and ammunition ; transportation of all sorts
; and perscnnel and nedical services. Some of these prac-
tical furctions are performed by staff corps officers and
line specialists, sose by unrestricted line officers, and
some by civilians £Bef« 8]«
On the international and national levels,
applied logistics deals with the broadest econcmic and
Industrial natters such as ; the sources and availabilities
cf raw naterials; tte state of the domestic ecocciy and
finances ; the availability of manufacturing plants, sJcilled
and unsJ(illed labor, design, and production engineers,
managenent; and otter similar affairs. Some persons may
prefer tc consider this as a combination of economic motili-
zaticn, and military planning. The precise levels attached
to the process are rot as important as understanding the
nature and interrelationship of the functions performed. On
3H
the higtest level the international and national situations
and d€cisicis must b€ continually interrelated. It is vital
to seek fcarniony among the national and international poli-
cies, strategic plans, and military programs. While it is
naiv€ tc expect to achieve complete harmony, it is very
important that we avoid contradiction- Policies and flans
aade ty Ictt international and national agencies, hut action
is aliicst always by rational agencies. There is an extraor-
dinary complex mixture of political, economic, strategic,
and logistic factors £fief- 8],
Planning lor the actual conduct of "operatioral
logistics" is based upon the strategic plans and the troad
logistics plans and policies of the theater and coamaoders
and upon their estioates of requirements. All of these
furnish the necessary guidance to the type commanders who
actually submit the recognitions and operate the lasic
logistic services afloat. As we move from the theaters
through the fleets tc the tasX forces, from the realm of
long-range plans and forecasts, to the actual repair and
replenistment of the comtat forces, the techniques of
tactical logistics are under constant scrutiny and improve-
aent in actual practice. However, the techniques and actual
procedures of so-called theater and fleet strategical logis-
tics are fregueitly imperfect and sometimes neglected in
peacetime. Anyone can understand the effect of a ship at sea
runnisc out of fuel and ammunition. But few officers urder-
stand the importance and nature of the long-range concurrent
strategic-operational logistics planning or the plaining
that will irsure the readiness of tasJc forces for sustained
combat operations in time of sudden emergency. In consid-
ering this division of logistics into various levels, we
should always remember that each level overlaps with the
other, both above ard belcw. There can never be a sharp
"chop line" of interest, although there are various "chop
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lines" of specific action responsibility. In all of the
ai)ov€ stages and relation ships we find changing gereral
characteristics and eophasis [Eef. 8].
Both pure and applied logistics can be roughly
divided into twc general classifications ; mobilization
logistics and operational logistics. Before operational
logistics can functicn, there must be the prior performance
of the mckillzation logistics function. Mobilization logis-
tics and operational logistics have a large area in ccsmcn.
Ihe nature cf the wax and its component parts is such that
sharp dividing lines ccui not be dravn between strategy,
tactics, and logistics. Instead, they blend and overlap in
many ccntinually varying ways. This is equally true whether
one is thinking in abstract terms or in practical functional
terms. An understarding cf both pure logistics and broad
aspects cf applied Icgistics is essential to the exercise of
high ccAsand. Ccntrcl of overall applied logistics requires
a Jcncwledge of the picblems of high command - particularly a
Juiowledge cf the relationships between the functional
elements of applied Icgistics [fief. 8 ]•
If one compare the definitions of silitary
logistics defined by Rider and Eccles, one can find the
fcllciiing ;
1. In terms of time, Eccles defined logistics in the
1S5C»s, but Eider did in the 1970«s, and tcth after
fiill.
2. Ihey tried tc define military logistics by dividing
into several levels, or into some different aspects.
3. If we consider their definitions more deeply, we can
find that both deal with military logistics from
strategic aspects to operational aspects.
If we take into account other writers' efforts
to define nilitary Icgistics , we can find that actually the
basic contents may be egual , but they differ in approach.
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As a conclusion, «e can define lilitary Icgis-
tics as; the related activities to create, to maintain and
to suifort military forces whicii will be in war or in feace.
As sutsets of a±ove definitior, we can divide it further
into strategic Icgistics and operational logistics.
Strategic logistics - the activities which support lilitary
strategy, operatiocal logistics - the activities which
support iiilitary forces and operations. The activities may
te desigr, development, production^ acquisition, storage,
lovenect, distribution, maintenance, disposition, construc-
tion, operations, and services according to specific iiili-
tary logistics objectives.
C. fiCfllESS L0GI5IIC5
lifferent types of logistician have different job speci-
fications. The logistician in one company may have an
entirely different set of job responsibilities from ore in
another ccufany. To illustrate, the logistician who may be
referred to as the distributicn manager frequently deals
with the outbound flow of gcods and responsible for ware-
housing, inventory maiagement, and transportation, whereas,
the logistician whose title is traffic manager will deal
only kith transportation. The materials management title is
giver to the logistician who deals with inbound flow of
materials ard has the responsibility for purchasing and for
inbound trar.sporta ticn. Finally, the logisticiar whose job
deals with engiceerirg may focus on design and maictain-
al)ility. Thus, with each different title comes a different
set of responsibility. One reason of these confusion may be
the UDClarity of the definition of logistics used in
industry or business.
Scne definitions of business logistics are ;
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1. Lcgistics deals with the total product flow frcn the
iuicund raw materials to the outhound finished gcods.
Ihe activities included in logistics are warehousing,
transportation, inventory management and materials
hazdling.
2. logistics deals with the total product life cycle
ficm the concept and design phase on through tc the
production of the product and its servicing in the
field.
3. logistics deals with the transportation and invento-
rying o£ the product in the field and its handlicg at
the customer Iccation.
4. lcgistics is a system discipline dealing with opera-
tions planning, invertcry control, and transportation
scheduling.
As one can see, the different definitions emphasize the
different aspects of the logistician's responsibility. The
variances in definition seem to have their origins in the
different esphasis areas as taught in different discipline
in the academic reals.
Mcst papers en lcgistics refer explicitly or implicitly
to the dcmestic contest. For most economies, the domestic
rather than internaticnal ccntext is more relevant. However,
the need tc balance trade flows and the stagnation cf seme
domestic markets has encouraged a growing interest in
exporting and, ccnseccently , international distribution, for
this reason, it should be meaningful to investigate the
concept cf business lcgistics in two parts - domestic lcgis-
tics and international logistics.
1 • Lca estlc Business Lc gi s tics
Per about three hundred years, logistics was the
exclusive property of military men. It appeared as an crga-
nizaticnal function ir a number of different armies, and it
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Has £uJ:j€ct of d€t»at€ among nilitary scholars as far tack as
the €arl:y 1880«s. But, not until WWII did logistics find a
permanent place in tte military profession. Much of what was
learned must have been carried to the business commuoity by
men uho le±t the service at the end of the war. Knowledge of
the nilitary logistics made a transition to the business and
acadenic ccnmunities £fief. 9]- The transition alleged by
Grahan H. Eider is as follow ;
In 1951. OsJcar Morgenstern who was working with the
BAND CC. at the tise. wrote that " there is an immeciate
similarity between nilitary logistics and the logistical
problems that have tc be solved daily in business. "He went
en tc formulate the probleas cf studying logistics through
compaxiscn cf military and business organizational parame-
ters.
John H. Fredrick published a college text in 1956 on
traffic Aanagement and that started by notj.ng the same situ-
ation; "Industrial traffic management and transportation
strategy are as impcrtant as logistics in military opera-
tions. Industry is discovering this, and it has meant the
enhancement of the prestige of industrial traffic macage-
ment
.
fobert H. Ivie, who is a coauthor of the text,
Business logistics, advised that he and the others whc coop-
erated in writing the text were teaching a course in
Industrial Iraffic Haiagement at Stanford in 1956. He said
that they had developed the course to a point where it
covered such mere cf business activity than that usually
found in a study of traffic management. Accordingly, they
decided to call their course Business Logistics.
1S60 was a tench mark year for literature en busi-
ness logistics as text books and articles in a variety ofjournals were published in significant numbers. Growth has
concerned at a measured pace since that time. Along the way,
people from academic areas other than Industrial Iraffic
fianaqement became interested ecough to claim that logistics
and their areas ef interest were similar. Hence, business
logistics has been equated with Physical Distribution
eanagement, Marketing Management, and Production Manageient.
In fact, each had a differeit interpretation of the same
thing £Bef. 9J.
Many writers cf logistics viewed logistics from
quite different points of view. Some saw it as a sccio-
econosic function, that is, logistics serves society by
perfciitirg some economic function such as creating value,
ethers viewed logistics as a system or subsystem of the
firm. Ihey described business logistics in terminology that
led tc constructs called system processes. Ihe final view of
3S
logistics, and the nest of ten encountered, offered defini-
tions of logistics in work-function terms- These terms
descriied the actual jobs usually found being done in husi-
ness fims that thej felt were an integrated part of the
logistics department's responsibility [Ref- 9]. Seme
useful, different approaches of concept of business logis-
tics ty Graham H. Rider 'are*^
1 - Phys ica l Sup ply and Ehysical Distribution
Ihcse actions which are reguired to facilitate the
creation of time and jlace utility for inbound and cuthound
goods and services that are demanded for either production
cr cccsuaption (socle-economic functional point of view).
2. Acquisition ^ Jcvement, Storage
At the systems approach, logistics acquires goods
and services as needed by other parts of the firm, Eoves
tJiem to the place wlere they are needed, and stores them
until the time occurs when they are needed. The system moni-
tors these processes so that as services and goods are
consulted, signals are generated through the feedback loop
that key the acguisition process and a smooth flow through
the system is assured.
Acguisition ; Providing goods and services which are
required by the organization. It includes purchasing,
leasing, renting, or hiring these goods and services as well
as decisions to acguire them from within the resources of
the orgaiization as veil as from without.
Movement ; Beallocating goods from one point to
another en cne cr mcie of the various modes of transperta-
tion. In general, goods are moved as raw materials from
crigin tc production as finished goods, from production to
consunpticn. It also includes oovement within the
»«• The three different approaches of the ccccept of
business logistics introduced here are mostly from fief. 9]
PP. 3S-41.
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orgaDi2aticr as well as movenient between the orgaEization
and its soffliers anc customers-
Stoxage ; The protective holding of inventcries of
raw matexials and fizished goods. It involves detersining
the size cf invertories, and decisions regarding locations.
^' Traf fic Man^aSfent, E§IS^21i§ifia# Inv ent ory Ccntrcl,
f locurement
At the organizational level, the following fields
are standing for business logistics.
Iraffic Mana gement ; Managing transportation of
incoming and outgoing goods including the movement of goods
cr both organizationally owned and control of movenect and
service; cost ; schedule; paper-work; and price.
fcareho
u
s ing ; The assembly, storage, and distribu-
tion of goods both incoming and outgoing. It includes
materials handling systems, system design, and equipment for
receiving , cataloging, packing if not part of production,.
crating, leading, aid shipping of goods to producticn or
consumption. Uarehcusing also involves decisiors about
leasing cr renting public facilities as opposed to purchase
cr construction cf private facilities, and decisions abcut
war€hcus€ design and Iccation.
Invent ory Control ; The planning for and ccntrcl of
the magcitude and costs of stocks, sometimes called stores,
of inccsing and cutgcing goods. It includes those activities
Known as production control and production scheduling, but
only in the limited sense of controlling the quantity of
cutgcing goods produced over any given period of tine as
well as the quantity cf inccmlng goods to be used in pr educ-
tion. It involves the identification and cataloging cf items
in inventory for ease of control and coordination with ether
crganizaticneil activities.
frocureaent ; The planning for and control of the
purchasing function cf developing new sources of supply.
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aaintainijig the apjicpriate relationships with existing
sources, developing catalogs and other information sources.
It includes the purchasing iucctions of buying in terms of
gualitj, guantity, price, scurce, and time as well as anal-
ysis atd decisions regarding those criteria. It includes the
post-purchasing functions of fcllow-up, expediting, and data
recording ard reporting.
As one can see above, a great deal of ccnfusion
exists aJtcut the concept of business logistics. One possitle
reascE for this confusion may be the diverse sources of
writers; seme from nilitary, others from academic fields
such as industrial traffic, physical distrituticn,
narJceting, aiid materials management. By eguating logistics
to their own disciplires, they have introduced terminclogy
not generally recogni2able by all.
After considering all three approaches, even though
the basic idea is same as military logistics stated in
earlier section, Graham H. Rider defines business logistics
as ;
The socio-economic function of physical supply and phys-
ical distribution that creates time and place utility
for gcods and services. As a system, logistics is
comprehended by the process of acquisition, movement,
and stcrace. In wcrx-functional terms, logistics is
prcccrement, traffic management, warehousing, and inven-
tory ccntrol ^Bef. S]-
Ihis definition of business logistics covers all
aspects cf logistics cf business field, and we can take it
as a definition cf business logistics.
2- International L ogis tics
G- J. Uavies [fief. 10] proposed a separate Icgistics
concept for international distribution. The intercaticnal
logistics conceft eajhasizes the movement of the expert
crder rather than tie movement of goods. It ignores the
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lEoveiECCt of materials into and within te iiroi which reoains
part cf th€ domestic logistics system. Davies stated in his
article £B€f- 10] that;
3he logistics concept should he transferable fiom
domestic to international business with no greater diffi-
culty than applying the concept to one product type and then
to ancth€r. There are- hcweier. a number of aifferences
between rational and international distribution. The Jiaior
three areas of differences are in documentation, in the
presence of a freight forwaipder, and in order processing.
Here in international logistics- again organizational prob-
lems should be considered. If international distribution
were obviously and closely related to domestic distribution,
a high level of integration migiit have been expected. Ihe
control over delivery promises and who controls the physical
delivery of goods is important one.
Ihe differences between domestic and international
logistics might be in customers (end users), and various
links to banlcs, insurance companies, customers and freight
forwarder have to be added to the domestic system- and order
processing and documentation are significant elements
affecting the flow of goods and money in International
logistics.
IhG problems encountered by a distribution system
iieavily involved in icterna tional business are more familiar
to European management than American management. Hacy coun-
tries have shifted their base of international conmitment
from a relatively siiple export - import operation tc kranch
operatiors abroad. The result of this shift from an export -
import orientation to a multi-national business operation
has caused some sigiificant changes in the total distribu-
tion oission of the firm. It is not uncommon to ship subas-
semblies from one country, raw materials from a secondary
for final assembly in a third country. The finished product
is then sold in the domestic market, exported to a third
country and perhaps reimported to the country supplying the
subasseoblies. This evolving distribution pattern in inter-
laticnal operations has created a significant challenge for
distributici managemeit in several ways ;
1. The documentation required for these multiple move-
Eents of raw uaterials- subassemblies and finished
goods is itself a formidable task.
2. Creating least cost movements in an omni-directional
distribution environment presents an ongoing problem
for the logistics manager.
3. Ihe distribution planning function must include a
consideration <;f different tariffs, export reguire-
lents- packaging. tax consessions, and reciprocal
tariff arrangements.
H3
Ii€ld ijiveiitciy20 in the international context now
relat€£ to the stock ield by a subsidiary or agent cftec Eot
directiy ccxtrolled ty the trader. The customer is often the
subsidiary cr agent rather than the end user. Furthernore,
the buyer, whoever te is, may wish to control the freight
link. Scmewhere, the various links to banks, insurance
companies, customers and freight forwarder have to be added
to th€ dcmestic system. Order processing and documentation
are new significant elements affecting the flow of goods and
money. G. J. Davies proposes that the domestic logistics
concept is, therefore, inappropriate to international trade.
International problems are not so associated with the
various costs in moving goods, but are more associated with
the ccst penalties associated with failing to move the order
from the customer, through the firm and back to custcmer.
fiecogrizing the physical movement of goods as a system leads
to greater efficiency in domestic trade. Recognizing the
lEovement of the crder as a system has a similar potential in
interrational trade.
Figure 3.2 represents Davies* international logis-
tics, and the concept recognizes two types of actii>ity,
liaiscn and TasJcs. Ihe central tasks activity consists of
three elements, receiving the inquiry, assembling the crder
and dispatching the order. The order is received frcm the
custcser and returned to him in the form of goods. Two types
of outfut are produced, the delivery promise and documenta-
tion. Tc mcve from ere task tc another, the international
logistics function has to liaise with other functions
iiiternal and external to the firm. Credit rating may be
possible within the firm or may reguire contact with an
external body who insure the exporter's risk from commercial
20S€€ the figure 3.1, figure 3.1 is reproduced from
£Bef- 10 pp. 48J.























< BOSINiSS LOGISTICS >
fig are 3.1 Ihe Business Logistics Concept.
default cr political action^^ £Be£. 10]. lo move to the
second tasX, the doicstic operation in the firm needs to be
consulted regarding tlie availability of stock or the lead-,
time en supply. Ihe international logistics function can now
produce its first output of significance, the delivery
promise. liaising tie rest cf the firm regarding the stcck
allovs tte assembly cf the export order. But before the
order can be dispatched, the goods Hill be insured, the
forwarder, if employed, will need advising and the interna-
tional logistics function will need to insure it has assem-
hied the data required for documentation. On regular
traffic flows, many companies undertake their own
forwarding. Davies has argued that having one fuDCticn,
either the international logistics function cr the
forwarder, responsible for both of the shipping and
forwarding o:les cortributed to export efficiency in that
one function can achieve an overview of the export process.
Ihe third task elemert, dispatch order, should be seen.
siFigure 3.2 is reproduced from £Bef. 10 pp. 52].
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therefore^ as a comiiuatioD of domestic dispatch management





























figure 3.2 The Interoational Logistics Concept,
£. ISIEGfiAIED LCGI53ICS SOIfOfil (ILS)
All elenent of Icgistics system have long-term aspects
vhich have to be put into a planning system, i.e., the plan-
ning cf a new transpcrtation methods, the planning of a new
distrituticn center. This planning must be coupled with the
production and marketing planning, but the traditional orga-
nization is often fouid to be a barrier. Acceptance of the
logi£tics__Jiianagement might require another organizational
structure and therefore needs top-management's approval. All
]:ig success stories in logistics start with the support of
the top. loday, top- management's concern for logistics
becoaes more important because all pressing problems seem to
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hav€ tieir impact or logistics ; the high cost cf ttocey
increases the need icr a better fflanagement of inveDtcries,
the high ccapetition calls for simultaneous search for cost
reducticE and hetter service levels.
Ike heart of tie logistics concept is an integrated
approach where cost savings are identified by considering
total costs of the system. Ihis approach already inplies the
need for overall macacement. Since the decisions aicut the
different elements of the logistics system (transportation,
invertcries, facilities, utilization, communications) are
traditicially made liithin different functions or depart-
nents. Hoiiever, the need for overall management tecones
more stringent where the effectiveness of the companies as a
whole is considered, i.e., when the logistics system has to
he brought into balance with the production system and the
oarXetinc system.
"J* log istics System Cocceft
Ihe logistics system in its totality is ccncerned
with the scvemect and storage of products from their law
state, thrcugh varicus stages of sub-assembly, packaging,
transportation and delivery to the final customer. Deperding
upon how widely one wishes to define the system it can be
seen that logistics considerations are involved throughout
the iiar>eting and exchange channel from the sources cf
supply tc the points of final consumption. To add tc the
complexity it is unlikely that the same corporate entity
will he invclved, or will exist which all impinge upon the
cperaticn cf the tctal system, e.g., the purchasing
subsystea, _ the prodcction subsystem, the transpcrtation
subsystet and'so on.
The logistics system concept is an attempt to tran-
scend the problems cf separate functions or subsystems by
identifying the interfaces between these sub-systems and
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advising means vhezety they relate to each other in the mcst
effective way - thus ensuring that internal contradicticns
in the ccrpcrate activity are ninimized.
Adopting the total systems concept in any context
implies an acceptance of the following points;
1. Ite whole is primary, and the parts are secondary-
2. Integration is the condition of the inter-relatedness
of the many parts within one.
3- Ihe parts so constitute an indissoluble whole that no
part can be affected without affecting all ether
parts.
4. Parts play their role in the light of the purpose for
which the whole e^cists.
5. Ihe nature of the parts and its function is derived
frcm its position in the whole, and its behavior is
regulated by the whole to part relationship.
6. Ihe whole is any systea or complex or configuration
of energy and behaves like a single piece nc matter
hcv complex.
7. Everything shculd start with the whole as a premise
aid parts and their relationship should evolve
££€f. 11].
Ihe clear implications here is that the conventioral
crganizaticr of many companies* logistics activities alcng
strictly delineated functional lines presents a real barrier
to the construction cf integrated flow systems. Rhat the
logistics systems concept in fact implies is that an crgaci-
zaticsal pattern that cuts across functional boundaries is
required, furthermore, traditional functional organization
has ccncerned itself more tith the way that inputs are
consumed with way that outputs are generated. Traditionally
the activities of the firm mirror its functional organiza-
tion. Seme conflicts may occur between functions cf the
firm cr sub-systems when goals are determined by functions
as
fcithcut legard for the impact of their actions u^cn the
total system. This ¥€ry cohubcd feature of corporate struc-
ture is called by the operations researchers as "suh-
cptinizaticn" - in otter words, a failure to recognize that
the uhcle can scmetiiies be less than the sum of its parts
[Eef. llj,
2- ihe Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) In The
Military Field
1o those Hhc are responsible for the operation of
nilitary systems and eguipment, it has become increasingly
obvious that a major limiting factor in their operational
capatility and availalility is logistic support. Operational
commanders carefully vatch the statistics on those items of
eguipoert that are net operationally ready because of main-
tenance or supply difficulties. They have come to recognize
the importance of having an adequate supply of spare parts,,
test and support eguipment, and a sufficient rusber of
trained personnel to operate and maintain the system. In
short, they have coae to recognize the importance of inte-
grated logistics support (IIS) . Our reliance on sophisti-
cated eguipment rather than on sheer manpower in future
combat situations emphasize the necessity for good logistics
planning and places real importance on the integration of
logistics consideration in the design process22 [fief. 13].
In the mid 1S60*s the emphasis on sub-optimization
of operaticral performance was recognized and there was a
turn arcurd in logistics support philosophy. Factors
contributing to this turn around in thought were ;
1. Operating cost exceeded the acquisition cost-
2. Onacceptable availability rates of major systems.
22lh€ IISP is represented in figure 3*3, and figure 3.3
is reproduced from [ Bef. 13].
US
3. £ic€£sive maitt€iiaiic€ repair time.
4. Iratility of the standard system to provide adequate
support,
Ih€ purpose of the IIS program is to improve opera-
tional readiness aid logistics support management while
linittizing operating and support costs. The key continuing
objectives ior achieving this purpose are;
1. Integration of logistic consideration into the
design. Ihe design phase is inherently iterative and
design decisioxs affect logistics support.
2. limely availability of all required logistics
resources. All elements of the support system must be
plarned/ acquired, tested, and deployed in phase with
the system or equipment.
Ihe concept of IIS and processes of ILS planning are
cot a panacea for all the problems associated with the
acquisition and support of nev sophisticated equipment.
However, they do provide a system for the integration of
logistic consideratioc into the design and the assurance of
timely availability of all required logistic resources
£Be£, 13].
3. Int egrated Distribution Management in Business field
frier to 196C's the total distribution nission of
the firs was not conceptualized by management as an inte-
grated task. fiathei the objective of physical supply was
achieved in a series of fragmented, uncoordinated ncvement
and storage sub-functions. Por example, customer order
processing was the responsibility of the accounting furc-
tion; tr af^f ic or transportation management to manufacturing;
warehousing to marketing, etc- With this state of functional
development, it was impossible to integrate the various
sub-tasks involved in the total distribution task either in
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Figure 3.3 Integrated logistics Support Plan (IISP).
resulting this poor coordination led to not only pcor
distriluticn performarce from the customer's point of view,
but in seme cases inefficiency, waste, and morale problems
from a aaragement pcirt of view. Ihe traffic manager, evalu-
ated en the size of his freight bill, shipped by full car-
lots and by the most economical transport mode. The sales
man, evaluated on the total sales, expected reliable and
rapid custcmer order service. The plant manager, evaluated
en unit ^reducticn cests, wanted to make all red ones in cne
size. These part of conflict within the organization were
freguertly resolved en the basis of departmental power with
resulting morale, efficiency, and service deterioration
[fief. 11].
Beginning in the 1960*s^ a number of ferward-
thinJiirg firms began to consider the potential of
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integraticc their distribution efforts into a unified vbcle,
toth frctt an orgaEizational and a control perspective
£Bef. 11:.
It night iD€ fcorthwhile to speculate the causes or
factors for the growing interest by businessmen ii inte-
grated distribution systems during the 1950»s and 1960 's.
liie fcllcwing are prcfably four primary factors which staped
the develcpaent of distribution thinking. 23
1. A mere scientific approach to business management;
Itere was a renewed interest in scientific management
of the business enterprise. Through the WWII period,
large gains have been made in the technology of
pxodLction. After WWII, there was increasing enphasis
upon the nariceting function. Ihe amount spent on the
advertising ir the American economy quadrupled. Ihe
number of new products launched increased almost
gecmetrically . Ihus, by the mid- fifties the tusi-
nessiiicui fuund him^aelr in a situation where production
techrology was *ell ad"\/anced and Ti^rketing cn.ctc were
steadily increasing. In order to reduce costs and
remain conpetitive. in the marketing place, cne of the
few areas that was relatively untouched was the
distribution cf the product. In many firms the cost
of distrihuticE represents from 18 to 45X cf total
costs. It would seem, therefore, that the new focus
upcn efficiencj in distribution was a logical out-
growth of the fltterican business environment.
2. Advance in ccj puter technolog y ; A second Ecajor
cause of the "Distribution Revolution", was the
a dvent of n«w t»?cnnology in data, processing. Cct side
effect of the cccputer has bee^ its impact upcn total
integration of management within the firm. Ihis has
23pximary factors are adopted from £Ref- 11]
caused a iDrtakdown id some oi the traditiocal
d€partmeiitali2ation within the firm and paved the say
fcr integrated distribution management.
3. iJifcrtance of distrifution in providing increased
levels of custcmer satisfa ctio n ; A third reason of
the increasing management attention to distribution
is nanagement's reccgrition of the importance of
distribution in providing customer satisf acticn-
farticularly , those companies selling relatively
hcmcgeneous products, often compete on the hasis of
efficiency in distribution and their profits in large
measure are determined ty their success in affecting
sound distribution.
^- giof it leverace ; Ihe fourth major influence upon
management thinking atout distribution is the profit
leverage available from reduced logistics ccst. As
carltets constantly expanded, emphasis was u^on.
increased sales. As the tempo of domestic and inter-
naticnal competition increased, a profit sgueeze was
reflected in lany American firm's balance sleet.
Curing lS60's, three approaches to the integrated
distribution management have emerged. Alternative
approaches of integrated distribution systems are as
fcllcw2* ;
1. He physical distxibuticn concept is basically
ccEcerned with the integration of finished gocds
distribution. Many of the firm's that have taken this
approach are in the high volume consumer packaged
goods business where the sales or marketing depart-
ment-has traditionally been functionally responsible
fcr the distritution task.
2^£ee [Eef. 11] fcr more approaches,
c -:
2- lie naterials Eacage ffent approacii usually evolves out
oi a traditioral purchasing orientaticn to mateiials
flow. As on€ can see in figure 3. 1 this af froach
fccuses on acguisition of raw materials, su^flies/
aid goods-in-piocess inventories. Many of tte firms
wiich take this type cf approacxi are involved in
industrial markets where the range of t<^'tertial
customers is limited and value added by manufacturing
is relatively tigh.
3. Ihe third area is Business Logistics, the concept
that has its icots in the science of militaiy logis-
tics
In a general sense, the concept of integrated
distritution may be expressed as; Integrated distribution
lanagenect is an approach to the distribution mission cf the
firm wher by two or acre of the functions involved in moving
goods frcm source tc user are integrated and vxewcvj as an
integrated system fcr purposes of managerial planning,
impleirentation and ccntrol. The scope of the alternative
approaches to iotecrated distribution management is not
clearly defined due to both the newness of the concept and
the fact tlat the individual business firm tailcrs the
concept to an ongoing organizational environment. Ihe
distritution mission cf a firm encompasses two or more func-
tions25 and they are listed in the table III.
25latl€ I is reprcduced from £He£. 12 PP. 7, table 1. ],
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TABIZ I






6. kareiiousing and storaging
7. Inventory control
8. Iraffic aid transportation.
9. Crder processing
10. Cistr ibuticn communications
11. farts and service support
12. Personnel oovement
14. Salvage and scrap disposal
15. Customer distribution program
16. Vendor distribution program
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IV, ilRATEGY AND LOGISTICS
£c far, we exanined the strategic iaacagement ccncept,
and Icgistics macageaent cciiC6i:t for both the busiress and
irilitary fields. Ic get better strategy and logistics
policy, it may be required to investigate the relationships
between strategy and logistics, the impacts of logistics on
strategy, the role or responsibilities of command and
staffs, and logistics and strategy flexibility.
A. HE fi£IATIOHSHIP£ EETWEEN STBATEGI AND LOGISTICS
Any conventional war which we may engage in may be
fought under the threat of nuclear war. The logistics of a
cold war requires economy of force. Logistics readiness,
both fcr conventional warfare and for nuclear warfare, and a
healtiy economy are required for the long-range econcmic-
political struggle.
Ite structure of war consists of a group of general
factors; political, economic, geographic, military, psycho-
logical, scientific, and technological. All these factors
are interrelated, and there is no sharp division between
them. AmcLg them, the ttilitary factors26 consist of
strategy, logistics, tactics, intelligence, and communica-
tions. These military factors are based on the general
factors and all the factors are interrelated. The dominant
factors are strategy, tactics, and logistics. Every war
situaticB- is a blend of strategical, logistical, and
tactical consideraticns £Bef« 14].
2«il:e military factors described briefly in figure 4.1
are reproduced from ££ef. 14 ff. 24].
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strategy ; determines the objective and
bread methods for attainment.
Lcgistics ; ficvides the means to create
and to support combat forces
and weapons.
Tactics ; determines the specific employment
of forces and weapons to attain
objectives cf strategy.
IntelJigence ; Shed light on the situation.
Ccsiiunication ; transmits information and decisicrs
Figure 4.1 Brief Description of Hilitar; Factors.
Seme types of strategic and logistic interrelations by
Benry E. Zccles £Bef. 14] are;
1. Scope and timing of strategic plan
2. Ccmpcsiticn, balance and deployment of forces, force
build-up
3. Strategic overseas base site selection build-up
4. Critical logistic element
5. Maintenance of political position without war
6. Strategy of blcckade, national economics, critical
Icgistic targets.
Henry F- Eccles stated that strategy is the ccjiprehen-
sive direction of pcfcer to control situations and areas in
crder to attain broad objectives. 27 strategy and destruction
are ret sjconymcus, strategy uses destruction cnly when
there is nc better way to attain control [fief. 14].
As we discussed in previous chapters logistics is the
Iridic between the economy of the nation and the tactical
cperaticcs of the ccicbat forces. An effective logistics
systea must be in hainony on the one hand with the eccooiEic
27Fi9ure 4.2 is reproduced from [fief. 14 pp. 26],
57
strategy is comprehensive-
Strategy is directicD cf fewer
Strategy is aimed at control
Strategy is always thinking cf objectives
Figure 4.2 nature of Military Strategy.
system cf the naticD, and en the other hand with the
tactical ccncepts and environment of the combat forces- Ihis
principle cf haraony explains why a single logistic system
can't successfully apply identical procedures to the sujpcrt
cf grcund, £ea and air forces- Differences in the tactical
concepts and the tactical environment create different needs
for Icgistics support organizations. Economic factors liait
the ccshat forces which can be created, logistics factors
limit the ccmbat forces which can be employed £Ref. 14].
Ihis relationships between strategy and logistics will
be exflained further hy investigating the impacts cf Icgis-
tics en strategy.
£. Ill IHfACTS CF ICGISIICS CH SIBAIEGI
Ardrew J. Ogan tried to explain the importance cf Icgis-
tics in his article ffief. 16]. He stressed the iupcrtance
cf Icgistics in the air force point cf view, but we can
thinJ{ cf it in a general military point of view- 28
2«Mc£t ef the ccntents of the following secticns are
£Bef. 16] with seme additional comm--"~ - .-
-
--^
pinion or the author of this thesis.
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1- Icqistics Determines Mili tary Capability
Begardless of the deficition of military capatility,
the Icgistics system determines the capability of each indi-
vidual weafcn systeiB- While that statement is accepted as
fact hjthin the logistics community, there is a great deal
cf skepticism among strategists and tacticians- The logis-
tics system determines whether a weapon system possesses any
actual iiilitciry capability at any given time as well as what
the character or nature of that capabiility may be. As an
example/ if we consider the impacts of fuels, munitions, and
spares cr weapon system, no weapon system can perform any
designed aission without fuel to move to the theater. Ihe
lack cf munitions may prevent the performance of the inter-
dictlcr assigned to the weapon systems. And even if both
fuel and sunltions are in plentiful supply, the lack of
spares may prevent the weapon system from even leaviig its
initial position. Khat the Icgistics system provides in
terms cf bcth the tjpes and the quantities of resources
detersines the nature of the capaiollity for weapon system
and tie entire operating theater. It is this control that
makes Icgistics such a dominating influence in the
successful employment of strategies and tactics [Bef. 16].
^« logistics Determines Tactic s
Rhile the tacticians plan the battlefield, the
logistics system determines where and how the field units
fight. Eoth the level and type of fighting are logistioally
constrained. The capacity cf the logistics network to
acquire and push resources into the theater controls the
level of conflict. Ihe type of fighting is, also, Icgisti-
cally ccntrclled by the kinds of resources shipped into the
theater. Operations may be delayed or dropped, not for
insufficient capacity, but because the unique resources
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required tc support C|eraticns were not available. There is
ample enidence to suggest that logistics has, in fact,
greatly impacted tactics ir fast conflicts. As a recent
example, in Vietnam, the front-line-forces faced resource
iioveaent difficulties. while there were adequate stocks
noving to the theater, insufficient port facilities and
distrituticn resources inhitiited redistribution in the
tiieater [Bef. 16].
logistics also determines the fighting opticrs open
to a ccamander by the type cf support it can offer. In
Vietnam again, air fewer actions were substantially reduced
due tc logistical constraints. Tactical changes called for
the use cf specified munitions for the mission. Air power
actions were curtailed until sufficient quantities of the
specified Eunitions could be located and shipped tc the
theater ty special airlift. 29
3- log istics Determines Strategy
Strategy determines the battlefield tactics. At its
center, strategy enccipasses two unique levels that are both
logistically dominated. An overall or grand strategy is
directed toward the development of the forces necessary to
support rational goals. Once the decision has been made to
fight, however, a wartine strategy broadly defines the
cbjectives required to sustain military operations until a
particular conflict or action can be favorably resolved.
Dnder each level, logistics estaialishes the basis for
success. Ihe overall strategy can be best considered as a
preparatory stage taken before a conflict arises or the
decision tc enter it has been made. This level of strategy
encompasses the development of two main objectives ; ( 1j
•
!Ihe ready units to support national objectives, (2). The
2«Fcr more examples, see £Bef. 16 pp. 21].
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structure tc support this urits over prolonged periods of
time. Overall strategy is synonymous with two commonly used
terms - readiness and sustainaiility £Ref. 16].
E€adines£ entails the maintenance of both hardware
iieaf:cE system and the personnel. This means that both rely
en an effective logistics system. The readiness of the
weapon system defends en the ability of the logistics system
to acguire sufficient resources to maintain them in cpera-
tional status. The logistical problems associated with fuels
and munitions have impacted not only the weapon system read-
iness but also the picficieicy cf the crews who must operate
them. Trailing missions have been reduced both in terms of
quantity and quality. The fuel shortages have restricted the
number and types of training missions £fie£. 16]« This oil-
shortage frcblems faced by ncn-oil-producing countries such
as Kcrea might influence the military training mere than
expected by oil-predncing countries^ especially for the
weapen system operating vehicles.
Overall strategy also includes the sustainability of
those units that are committed to a conflict. Again the
logistics system determines the success of any piolenged
ailitary effort. The industrial base controls the prcjection
cf limitary power. Industrial planning is essential to
ensure the availability of sufficient capacity and materials
to meet the rescurce reguirenents of war. To change the
industrial base and its impacts on sustainability will
require sany years of adjustments and redirection based upon
a national sense of need and a strong commitment. The
wartine strategy establishes the overall objectives cf the
conflict and- identifies the individual steps necessary to
achieve them. Te this area, logistics is a critical, almcst
cverridirg, consideration in the three primary applicaticns
cf wartiiie strategy, i.e., force movements, force reconsti-
tuticn, and force direction. To support the movement of
61
forces, logistics mtst he involved because overall victory
can crly he sustained with resources [fief. 16].
lie can see tie impacts of logistics on strategy by
the fcllcnirg examples. The Normandy invasion established a
firm i.as€ for the destructicn of the German Army and the
liberaticn cf Europe. It illustrates the integration cf the
stratecic, logistical and tactical planning. It alsc illus-
trates tie problem of the composition of balance and dejlcy-
lent cf ccatat and logistic forces. Ihe Normandy larding
«as delated one aonth to allcw time for strategic build-^up.
Ihe Scuthern France landing vas delayed two months because
cf critical logistic element - the availability of landing
craft. Ivery HHII Eacific amphibious landing illustrates
this relaticn betweer strategy and logistics. The results of
those lardings was a successful strategic drive toward the
enemy hcieland and tie destruction of the enemy bases, his
fleet and his air force. They illustrate the problem of
cverseas base site selection and the logistic build-up along
a line of strategic advance.
C^ ICGISIICS Ali£ 5TEATEGY ilEIIBILITY
Ihe availability of any particular weapon should not
detemine the strategy to be used. Strategy must have at its
disposal a variety of weapons and forces so that particular
combiration must suitable to the situation as it actually
arises, may be quickly formed, and swiftly and decisively
employed in tiie apprcpriate manner, [fief. 14].
flexibility comes initially from the perception and
charactej:_cf the connander. It comes from sound strategic
and tactf±C3T-concepts, and variety of weapons appropriate to
the nature and degree cf coctrcl that you wish to establish.
It means that there must be mobility of forces and there
must be a flexible organization. The logistic support mcst
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±e respcEsive to strategic and tactical command Deeds, and
that Hears there must be responsive logistic resources and a
transf crtation system which is resp^onsive to the iamediate
ceeds ex operaticnal commander £Bef. 14].
Stratecj flexibility has its primary sources in the
competence, percepticr, and character of high command, iihile
ether factors are also important, sound logistic concepts
and a sound logistics system provide the physical base lor
strategic flexibility. Ihis means that logistics system must
be studied from the perspective of high command, and it also
means that comoandei must understand logistics. Ihe
perspective of ccmmand is that point of view vhich knovs the
nature and relationship of the technical problems of
commands, which recognizes hov they affect its capabilities,
and whicb understands the amount of time and effect required
to solve these prcblems. logistics will always liait
strategy and operaticis, and since, when one logistic liai"-
tatics is overcome, arcther limitation will takes its place.
A command must always be sure which logistic factors are
exercising their limiting influence in any particular stra-
tegic or operational plan he is carrying out or contem-
plating. Icgistic support may be considered inadequate by a
timid or mediocre ccimander, but it may be adequate for a
bold and competent commander who understands the nature and
sources cf flexibility, provided he has adequate ccmmand
contrcl cf a flexible logistic system [fief. 14].
lE general, logistics plays a vital role in the attain-
ment cf strategy flexibility.
C. I££ £CI£-.OF COHHlt£ AHO IIS STkPF
Even though all military factors discussed in the
previous sections were considered completely, if the
commanders cf each level of military field can't meet their
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loie cr r€f ionsitiliti properly, the result cf any ccrflict
aay ECt te the desiratle one. Therefore, some more ccmmeEts
CD the rcle of ccmmarc and its staffs might te required for
tetter perfcrmance in relaticn to strategy and logistics,
1- 3i§ Bole of Ccamand er
Ihe most impcrtant element in war in the past has
leen tte lind of comander, and this will continue to be
true in war today or in the future. Henry E- Eccles stated
that ccmiander transforms war potential into comisat power by
its ccnticl and use cf the logistic process. Thus wisdom in
high ccanarder requires a knowledge of both economic factors
and of logistic factors [Ref. 14]. Henry £. Eccles also
argued ir a lecture delivered at the Naval War College that
the ccmmander must ](iou the tasks, the problems, and the
challenges cf his technical specialists. He must ie able to
reconcile the contradictions uhich inevitably arise, tie must
te alle tc compensate for deficiency in one area by action
in another, and must te at times willing to sacrifice one or
sore special interests in tbe higher interests of the
cverall ctjectivcs of the ccmmand, and this is not a simple
task £Bef. 15].
A scund concept of strategy is the foundaticu for
all high military thinking- The higher the the level of
thought, the more strategy and logistics tend to coalesce. A
sound strategy must te the essential element of all high
military thinking. At tbe highest level of ccmmand,
commander is concerned with the economic-logistic irfluences
and their iimitaticns on strategic decision- As the level of
command jie'prends, these lisitations and influence terd to
shift tc the purely Icgistical, and they limit and influence
the immediate employment cf specific combat forces
£Bef. 15].
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Ihe mind of civilian commander is ccncerned fiina-
rily Mith economic iriluences and limitations, however, the
uind cf ttilitary comnander is concerned priaarily with oper-
ational logistic inlluences and limitations, although it
oust consider in the economic field as well. 5ut, the chief
point is that both civilian and military commanders must he
aware cf these influerces and of these limitations, and must




p on si till tie s of S taff s
For effective operations, it is necessary to inte-
grate the strategies and logistic planning.
Basis for Flans 1 Logistics
Objective or dissicn 1 Tine-phased logistic reguire-
Ihe Forces Involved J meets both to create and
The Schese 1 support the combat forces.
The Intensity of £ction| What? How much?
The Tittirg i When? Where ?
figure 4.3 Tie Basis for Plans and Logistics.
As presented in the figure 4.3, the basis fcr flans
is the objective or the mission, the forces involved, the
scheme of naneuver, the intensity of action, and the timing.
All this fflfst related to the geography and to the avail-
ability cf combat forces. ^^ From these factors, we can
3opicure 4.3 is a simplified expression of the contents
of £E€f.^15 pp. 33]. ^ ^
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develcp tiai€-pha£ed logistic reguirements both to create and
to support the ccmtat forces. The concepts must ccme fiom
the ttiud of command. Eut in our compiex technology cf today,
the ttind cf comaand nust te supplemented by efficient and
understarding staff work £Hef. 15J.
lie staff responsibilities presented by Henry E-
Iccles are expressed briefly in the figure 4.4. For this to
te effective, the strategic-logistic discussions and thought
among the members of the staff in the logistics divisicc and
in the operations division must be concurrent. The man who
are doing operational and strategic planning must know
Operations states forces and schemes.
logistics states probable shortages.
Operation and logistics jointly suggest modifications.
CcaiDacd evaluates and decides.
Figure 4.4 The Staff Responsibilities.
enough about logistics so that their schemes are not absurd.
In reJaticr to these respcnsibilities, Henry £. Eccles
strongly argued tiiat ;
It is not the task of logistics division to decide
logistics feasibility. The logistics division decides on
the logistic reguiiements to support a scheme for oper-
atinc ccobat forces. It oust know the state of logistic
availabilities, and states to the commander what shcrt-
ages t-c-expect under the scheme which he proposes. One
of th^_L£.ugJaest of all ccmmand decisions is to decide
this question of "logistic feasibility". It can't be
passed to a logistics division except in cases where the
mass of aaterial, the complexity, and the lack of fore-
sight lave been so great as to result in a plan which is
so cbviousiy tad that it can't come close to being
supported £Ref. 15].
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Ihe logistics officer must always have the view
foint of ccmmard . He mast always seeX to harmcDize and
reconcile conflictirg tecinical interests in order to
l;road€n the objectives of command. It is equally iufcrtant
for the ccnmander tc understand logistics, for if the
ccmmancei doesn't understand logistics, logistics considera-
tions will dominate his decisicns, whereas if he does under-
stand logistics, logistics considerations will influence his
decisicrs.
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V. I CGI STICS JIBATEGJ ICR ROK aillTAEl FORCES
Ic investigate tte logistics strategy for RCK Military
forces, it will be necessary to study the relaticnship
s
tetween fCK and U.S., the realities in Korean Peninsula, the
analysis of logistics problem, the alternatiijes to resolve
frobleis perceived, and finally the logistics strategy for
ROK and tie 0. S. foreign policy in relation to ROK.
1. I££ ££IATI0M5HIf£ E£T«E£B EOK AND THE O.S.
Thirty three years ago, on June 25, 1950, North Korean
troops invaded the Scuth Korean Republic. Ihe U.S. and ether
nations, under the Jurisdiction of the United Nations,
intervened to halt and push lack this attack and reestab-
lished the integrity cf the Republic of Korea (ROK) roughly
along the lines of partition which were in effect at the end
cf WHII. Curing this war period, 1950 - 1953, there were
136,528 ffilitary casualties from the U.S., over 15,501 lili-
tary casualties froi all U.N. participants, and about
S43,512 South Korean nilitary casualties. 3
x
In tie intervening years, the U.S. has acted as the
primary guarantor of South Korean's integrity under the
charter cf the United Nations. The U.S. since 1953 has
exercised hcth international responsibilities and national
interests in maintaining a silitary presence on Kcrean
feninsula. Over the years, this investment cf U.S. forces
has ccae— under sporadic ^questioning, and there have been
repeated" proposals fcr reducing or withdrawing U.S. forces
from tte peninsula. During the Nixon Administration, an




Estimated Casualties of The Korean War




C cent lies Missing
Australia 265 1,387 1,652
Eelgium 97 355 452
Carada 309 1,235 1,544
Cclcntia 140 517 657
Ethicfia 120 536 656
France 288 836 1, 124
Gr€£C€ 169 545 714
Netherlaiids 111 593 704
N€iiZ€aland 31 78 109
Philixpices 92 356 446
ECK 415,004 428,568 843,572
Sooth Africa 20 16 36
Thailand 114 799 913
lurkev 717 2,413 3, 130
U.S. 29,550 106,978 136,528









Source : Eobert lecJcie* "Conflict"* The History
of Kcrean War 1950-1953, G.P- PutnaiQ«s Son's,
N.Y. 1982, PP,. 429-
infantry divisior was jiulled cut- In 1977 President Carter
propcsed a total withdrawal of ground forces from Korea, tut
this decision was first delayed and then was rescinded in
1981 ty fclitical change in Washington and military reali-
ties in Asia £fief. 17*.
The motives for the arncunced pull-out as stated by
Ernest k. Lefever £fief. 18] seem to relate a desire to
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DorJiializ€ relaticns atroad and a determination to avoid U.S.
invclveaent in anothei Asian conflict, as well as tc £€ccn-
dary coisiderations including alle;jed defense savings,
recovery of the U.S. image dimmed by Vietnam , enccurage-
jiient cf South Korea self-reliance.
Ihe U.S. has been involved successfully in a limited yar
in Korea and unsuccessfully in a limited conflict in
Vietnaa. lefever stated that the motive of avoiding
embrcilaent in a nev conflict on the Asian mainland (or
anywhere else, for ttat matter) is understandable. Yet, the
avoidarce cf invclvenent in possible war can hardly te the
only D.S. objective cr responsibility, Ihe U.S. tears a
solemn treaty obligation tc defend the fiOK against aggres-
sion CI ccnguest by the North.
Korea is the one area in the Pacific Basin where the
interests cf the icur major regional powers - Japan,
Commurist China, the CSSfi and the U.S. - intersect directly
and significantly, and Korea is vital to the security of
Japan and crucial to the entire U.S. position in the western
Pacific- A removal cf 0-S. military force might consign the
O.S. to a minor role in North Asia, with incalculafle ccnse-
guences for the regicral power balance and U.S. interests.
Ihe glcbal defense ccomitments of the U.S. are ever mere
conticgeit upon the contributions and close cooperaticn of
allies £B€i. 18].
Ihe C.S. may net shrink from conflict if and when its
vital interests are challenged. But, we must consider the
Congress and public cpinion when active war occured in any
place in the world. If an active war occurs in Korean
Peninsu li~acd the O.S. decide to pull-out its military or
ground fcrces according to the decision of the Congress or
according tc the public opinion, then the impact cf the
decisicn on Korea and Asia more generally wculd be
prof cund. Even though^ the BCK and the O.S. think that the
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D.S. would not full-cut its ground forces during ar active
fcar - tut, protabli during i^eace. Lefever outlined the
following fossitle contingencies, 32 and if acy one of which
materialized, it would jeopardize the U.S. interest ic j^eace
and ^tatility in Asia and the facific.
North Korea, with Scviet encouragement, might
accelerate its military J3uild-up as it did after
the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from the
South Korea in the early 1970s. Ihis tuild-up
cculd culminate that the U.S. would be in the
final analysis steer clear of a new conflict on
the periphery of Asia.
Sensing the decline of America power ic the
region, the Scviet Union might become more active
politically and militarily, expecting that a
unified Korea under its aegis would strengthen
its position against China and vis-a- vis Japar.
Japan might lose confidence in the U.S. security
conmitment and gradually be forced toward compre-
hensive accommodation with the Soviet Onion,
China or both.
China, apprehensive of Soviet moves in the wake
of a perceived diminution of tiie U.S. commitmect,
might be emfcldened in its efforts to take over
Taiwan by ccnguest or other means.
Fearing complete abandonment by the U.S., South
Korea migit press rapidly the nuclear capabili-
ties of its own as a substitute for the vanishing
U.S. deterrent .
Feeling more threatened, in secure and vulnerable
to Internal subversion and external attack, the
I
clitical situation of South Korea may be sterner
han before.
7. Ihe Republic of China, anticipating a total aban-
dorment by tie U.S. m the wake of Korean with-
drawal as well as an accelerated U.S. guest to
normalize relations with Peking, might chart a
more indeperdent course, including the develop-
ment of an independent nuclear deterrent.
6. Ihe Philippires, already demanding what amounts
to ransom from Washington as rent for two U.S.
military bases, Clark Field and Subic Bay, might
deny these base rights to the U.S.
32£e€ £Eef. 18 pp. 34].
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lE addition to these coutiDgencies hy Lefever, we should
consider twc more factors; (1)- The ROK would not he aban-
doned ccjEfletely by the U.S. or by the allied countries,
tecause cf the importance of the ROK in relation to its
location. (2). Eecertly^ the relationships between the U.S.
and TEC are becoming lore friendly than before, and it will,
to sone extent, hel^ the maictenance of the peace in Kcrean
Eeninsula.
In 1S81, the Reagan Administration halted the withdrawal
cf 0.£. grcund forces (the 2nd Infantry Division) and is in
the process of sodeiiizing both its ground and air ccmpo-
nents en the peninsula. More important. Secretary of Defense
KeinJzerger committed the O.S. to the continued support cf
EOK Icrce Improvement Program (FIP) , which envisions contin-
uing investments of upwards of $1 to 2 billion a year on
research ard development and acquisition of appropriate
programs. The ROK has merited the status of a strong and
faithful ally, and has staged over time significant ccDtri-
tutions to its own defense with the help of the 0.£..
Earticularly, the RCK military participated in the Vietram
kar. Ihcse contributions will continue, and the £OK*s
forward defense wall can be shared up against the rising
cffensive capabilities of a determined opponent. However,
improvements are needed, since there exist power imbalance
between the ROK and the North Korea as stated in [fief- 17].
Ihis will be discussed in detail in the following section.
£. IE£ EEAIITIE5 OF FCfiElM fESINSOLA
1 - ISIli Korean Mi litary force Build- up
E€C€Jit asse££«eDts33 have traced a renarkeratle
growth ir Ncrth Korear military power in ground, naval and
air fcrc€£ as well as unconventional warfare capabilities.
Rhat has nace this growth all the more disturbing is that it
unfolded during a period when North Korean's, Kim II Surg,
professed tc be steering a course of peaceful industrial
development for his country and rapproachment with the RCK.
Ihe assessment suggest that North Korea today not only is
the clearly super lilitary power on the peninsula, tut
commands the third or fourth largest communist army in the
worlds following PRC and the Soviet Union (and roughly egual
to that of Vietnam) . A starker comparison is that the North
Korean Army is almost as large as the U.S. Army. Ihis stag-
gering lilitary build-up reflects a huge investment of.
resources. Some western analysts estimate that North Korean
now allocates about 20X of its GNP to defense, and it means
that this small country of about 13 million people now makes
the largest per capita expenditure on defense of any country
in the wcrld except Israel £fief. 17 J.
Ihe gains in the strength of the North Korean ground
forces are presented in table III for ten years of ccnipar-
ison.34 It shows that the size of North Korean Army has
doubled to at least 700,000 men. Its inventory of tube
artillery similaily has undergone a twofold increase, *hile
the number of multiple rocket launchers has tripled. Its
armor-tarJcs and personnel carriers - has multiplied ty a
33£e€ £Be£. 17 pp. 64-66].
3*Tatl€ HI is reproduced from Tfief. 17 Table 1 pp. 65].
lor lEore detail estifiates of strength of the Ncrtii Korea,
see "North Korea - A Country Study", Area Handbook Series,
ty Headquarters, Department of The Army, DA Pam 550-81
Supers€d€slS76, Ihird Edition, EP. 257- 161.
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TAfll III
North Korean Groaod forces (1970 - 1980)
1S70 1980
f erscDDel 350,000 700,000
Artiller^y (tut€) 2,200 4,100
am 700 2,000
Ia£k£/A££ault Guii£ 900 2,700
AfC 100 1,100
factcr ci three anc ten resj^ectively- These huge fcice
increases vere staged after Kim II Sung announced in 1S69
his fclicy o£ peace and reconciliation with fiCK.
Intelligences nov suggest that all new North Korean arnor
comes fics domestic production, and some analysts purport
that North Korean factories produce 300 to 400 tracked reti-
cles per year £fi€f« 17].
2. ICK and North Korea Force Comparison
Ihe impact of North Korean military tuild-up en the
regional ialance can te seen in Tahle V. Ihe O.S. and its
allies ir the Pacific once drew comfort from the fact that
the army of HOK suiastantially outnumbered its counter part
in the Ncrth. This relaxed view of the balance on the Korean
feninsula prompted President Nixon to remove a U.S. division
in 1S71. Table IV shows that today the numbers in all
categcr^S_^vor the North Korea, but even those figures
don't tell the full story cf the relative combat potential
cf the tiio sides. 35 Cotter and Winxer compared the lilitary
35Tatle IV is reproduced from [Hef. 17 pp. 65] and



























forces of ECK and North Korea £ Bef- 17]. Both the fiOK and
North Korea have fomidatle military establishment. A ccmti-
ration cf ailitary, political and psychological factors,
however, gives the Ncrth the edge, despite the fiOK*s larcer
population, much larcer GNP, and greater productivity. Ihe
North is largely equipped ty Soviet Onion, and the fCK by
the D.S. Ihe disparity of the artillery capabilities are a
particularly significant part cf the picture because the
supressiie capabilities and survival of £0K artillery will
tear centrally en the ability of North Korean forces to
Ireach the forward defense concept of the U.S. and fiCK. The
EOK tcday is sharply handicapped by the fact that incre than
half cf its"- artillery is substantially inferior in both
range and supressior to that which would support invading
North Kcrear echelons. Siailarly, deficiencies apply to
anti-armcr systems. £any of the anti-tanJc weapons in the EOK
are ncucted on jeejs and dcn't have the protecticE to
survive aid operate in the expected supressive envirccment
£Ref. 17*.
lefever analyzed that the superiority of tie North
in loanpcwer, aircralt, tacks and ships is sharpened by two
ether factors ;
(a) . The sigxificantlj lar^jer pericds of military
service required hy North. j(JdJ[ .Pivotal in the North's
advantage, however, is the political and military crien-
taticn of North Korean forces, which are configured mere
for attack than defense, while the reverse holds true




Fexicds of flilitacy Service
BCK North Korea
2. 5 years 7 years
3 5
crc€ 3 3-4
Ihe Korean Fecinsula covers a small area; the EOK
itself is atout the size of Flcrida. But, two of the largest
field amies in the world now confront each other in that
narrcv space, ready fcr comtat on short notice. The danger
from tj^€- North is urderscored ty the extensive invasion
tunn€ljE~dug tinder the OHZ, amiDushes of U.S. and South Korean
soldiers, suiversive efforts, a constant stream of helliccse
propaganda from fiadic Pyongyarg and provocative incidents
such as the fiangoon Icmi^ing as a recent example.
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Ihe iiiJitaiy advantaccs of the North are redressed today by
the pres€EC€ of U-S- military forces in the South and the
rearty Seventh Fleet, for 24 years there has been statility
en the Kcrean Peninsula, thanks frimarily to the preserce of
U.S. forces in the Scuth £E€f, 18J.
3- l^i^cted War Scenario and Operational Imperatives
for EOK
a. Expected Rar Scenario by the North Korea
After studying the model of Uie Soviet Uricn and
the Kcrean conflict, Cctter and Hinker constructed a concept
cf operations that tie North Korean might plausibly fcllcu.
(1). It is clear that a new North aggression vculd
aim at the objective of tring about the rapid cclitical
ccllapse cf BOK ard the guide occupation of all cf tiie
peninsula before the U.S. could substantially respond
with air, ground ard naval reinforcements.
(2). Ihe existing Ncrth Korea force structure
fersits a caspaign along the following simultaneous
rents.
(a) . A massive ground and air attack across
the EKZ.
(b) . Ihe temporary isolation of the
Pen insula.
(c) . Attacks on key facilities throughout
South Korea.
(3) . The £ancer Commandos will execute operations
through the depth ci ccuntry-
(U) . The isolation of the peninsula reguires the
mining or port facilities and the Knocking out airfields
and key ccmmunicatici centers £fie£« 17].
But, by far the najor concern of EOK defense
focuses en the improvement of the forward defense system so
as te cope with a massive air/ground attack across the LUZ,
t. Operational Imperatives for EOK Defense
Cotter and Winker further noted that an attack
ty echelcned forces, featuring the skillful use of its capa-
lilities for fire and maneuver, can be devastating fcr an
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ill-f r€f ared defense, and there is obviously a number of
ways ij]_ which a defersive system can be organized, tut in
ECK tie choice is nairowed ty the imperative ox a defense
that is fcell forwarc- Ihe tasic doctrinal framework for a
iiodern fcrward defense has teen reformulated by the U.S.
Army.
(1) . It specifies the way air-supported ccrps,
divisiccs and brigades shall deal with an attacking
echelcred force.
(2). In the case of Ncrth attack, infantry will be
on the first echelcr. with armored divisions in the 2Ld,
and perhaps the thiid echelons.
{3\ . The fundamental problem facing a fcrvard
defense is how to deploy and operate a system that can
find and target tiese echelcned forces far over the
horizon wJiile the central battle is in progress
£fi€f- 17].
Cotter and Winker stated in their article that ;
In the event of new aggression, U.S. and ROK forces will
not ie littited to the objective of restoring the status
?uc ante, as happened in 1953. Rather the aim will be
o achieve the military advantages that can ensure a
more stable territcxiai settlement. Consequently, for
political as well as military reasons, a strong counter-
offensive is ax integral part of any forward defense in
Korea. Ihe key physical capabilities required for a
forward defense are;
(1) . Over the horizon surveillance. 12) . Delivery
systems with appropriate munitions. (3) . A conmand
structure, supported bv communications, which allcws
the integraticn of all sources of informatioc and
its rapid distribution to appropriate maneuver, fire
support and air elements.
In line with these requirements, the responsi-
bilities of the defense system might best be distrituted as
foil W £ *
llj. The brigade commanders are concerned with the
assaulting infantry regiments and the Gancer
Ccnmandos. (2). Ihe division commanders deal with the
second-echelon infantry regiments. (3) .Ihe corps
ccKoanders handle the second- and third-echelon armor
and mechanized divisions.
-The primary weapons . against the infantry and its
echelons will be artillery, while the brunt of the task of
disrupting and destroying the armored and mechanized divi-
sions will be carried by U.S. and fiOKAF £Bef. 17].
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To summarize the success of a forward deferse in
Korean hinges on several related capabilities- Ihe defense
Eust te atle to see, track and thereby determine the inten-
sion cf each echelon cf the attacking force- They should,
if necessary, ie atle to bring ordnance to bear or all
echelons in amounts that disrupt (or preferably destroy)
them before they can approach the forward line of trcops.
Ihus, the tattlefieid is extended inward into enemy terri-
tory. Attrition of the enemy's forces is exacted directly
and en his own soil, khen the initial assault is blunted and
the eceny echelons axe disrupted, a vigorous counter-
offensive can be launched into North Korean territcry
through the use of air, artillery and maneuver forces
[Bef, 17],
c. Some Needed Hardware Components
Cotter and ninker analyzed some needed hardware
components that are xeguired by the BOK and O.S. forces in
Korean feninsula. Tte key requirements for the U.S. and EOK
for oier-the-horizon surveillacce in Korea can te net by
exploiting the rapid advances in electronics, such as
electio-optical cameras, ground surveillance radars,
receivers that look fox electric emiters, as well as otter
sensors that can be carried in manned and unmanned aircraft
or positioned on the ground [fief. 17].
Direct- and indirect-fire weapons are needed to
redress the force ratio and force density imbalances ttat
now favor the potential aggressors in Korea and to provide
the capaiilities to carry the battle into enemy territcry.
These naterial improvements can be grouped into 3 tread
categories [fief. 17] ;
(1). Survivatle direct weapons- (2)- Survivatle
artillery- (3). Air- to- ground dispensers carrying
area munitions for use against armor, airfields and
otter facilities-
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The j:res€Lt inibalaDce in anti-armor can he ever-
come hy increasing tie numter of anti-tanJc missile systems
in the hards of ROK forces by a factor of two tc three,
placirg them under ^.totective armor and on helicopters for
rapid use against breakthrough concentrations- The Noith
Korean army is formidable, but its assaulting infantry
reguiiements are highly vulnerable to anti-personrel niuri-
tions- Ihe U-S, Aimy has developed and is now producing
this ammuEition and the means for delivery. The replacement
cf 105oii artillery %ith the 155ma piece should correct the
current imialances in artillery capabilities. The present
capatility cf U,S, and BOK Air Force to destroy echeloned
armor needs imprcveoert £Bef« 17 ]•
This discussion of improvements is by no ueans
complete, having focused only on the more essential itens in
the O.S./fiCK inventory moderni2ation. The basic thrust of
the foregoing, in ary event, has been to demonstrate that
Korea is one potertial battlefield where imbalances in
convertional capabilities in favor of the potential aggres-
sion can te corrected by the selective infusion cf tech-
nology that is available on the shelf or in late stages of
development. But this infusion must be tailored to a compre-
hensive and integrative concept of operations that is keecly
sensitive tc the potential enemy's operational code and its
inheritant vulnerabilities £Bef« 17].
C. LlllhSl 5TBATEG7 Cf O.S. IB BELATION TO KOBEA
General John J. Hennessey (USA) stated that the primary
D.S. defense objective is deterrence and intercatiocal
stability. 3 *"0.S. deterrence policy has employed a total
force concept embracing its allies, as defined in the Kixon
Loctrine £Bef. 21]. O.S. national policy remains based on
3«£€e ££ef • 19 pp, 44].
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the i;rinciple that wax is an unacceptable means of settling
disputes aicng nations. U.S. still believe in deterrence, in
discouraging conflict from a position of strength- It aakes
sense and has been successful waen effectively applied
£fief, 21j.
General Jack J. Catton (CSAF) stated in his article
£Bef. 21] that the total force concept is a force to
ttaxiiize the free world force available to meet a ccctin-
gency. Added to 0. S. cwn active duty and reserve forces are
those free world forces - allies ^ who will join U.S. to
meet a shared threat. The definition of the total force
tends to te an enuoeration of how much hardware and what
systeis, in what guartity and guality, are needed.
General Hennessey stated that;
As part cf overall deterrence capability of the O.S.,
the U.£. must demonstrate a clear and evident capacity
and resclve to fiqht^ either alone or in concert with
allies, at any level or conflict, conventionally or with
nuclear weapons, so that any potential adversary will
diSZiss, his own risX to be unacceptable. Specifically,
the U.£. must maintain a cleanly- perceived equivalence
in Euclear forces ^is-a-vis the USSR. Concurrently, U.S.
must maictain the atility to deter the use. or threat of
use^ cf conventicral forces against the U.S., its
deployed forces, its allies or other nations considered
vital to C.S. security or interests £Bef. 19].
Eecause the O.S. has neither the manpower nor the sili-
tary rescorce tc counter unilaterally all military threats
to its cwn n^ onal interests or the collective security
provided through regional security agreements or through
lilateral treaties iiith individual allies or friendly
naticns. O.S. provided economic and military assistance to
friendly nations, and they in turn support forward-deployed
Q.S. ccotat" forces in times of hostilities or threats of
iostiiities [fief. 19].
Ihe C,S., with its strategic nuclear forces alone, can't
deter all ccntingencies which could affect the interests of
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it- for Bacy situaticLS , ccr-nuclear forces must tear the
ttain tcrden of deterrence. As have been demonstrated many
times since WWII, strategic nuclear forces alone can not
guarartee ^leace or icternational stability. Essertially,
there is a continuing need for a U.S. military strategy that
naintains a strong defense capability even though its
current lelationship with its principal adversary is less
than lelligerent and hostile £Bef. 19].
General Catton emphasized the role of logistics in
fclicj ard strategy, especially for current U.S. deterrence
defense policy- He stated that ;
There is a tendency to neglect the importance of logis-
tics, a aisunderstarding which, when allowed to persist,
threatens the effectiveness of total force. Too often in
limited funding, the money also follows this neglect,
which oicht result in inadequate financing for the
support function. Only responsive logistics gives
meaning to realistic deterrence, and thus we must recog-
nize that the force which performs the function of
supply and mainterance contributes to this nation's
overall deterrence posture. The logistics of deterrence
recognizes that wl:en the enemy planner sits down to
assess our forces, he values only those which the logis-
tics system has ready or can get ready in time and
sustain. Today's national policy calls for strength,
partnership and willing cess to negotiate. All are
interrelated but draw their efficacy from strength which
demajids and receives a second logistics base [Sef. 21].
Tie total force policy calls upon mutual support by
active and reserve cciponerts of U.S. military forces and
the military forces cf friendly nations- Forward defense is
complemented by U.S. -based strategic reserve and strategic
nilitary forces. U.S. military strength and the world's
perception of that strength are fundamental to deterrence
and the maintenance of world stability. The operational
readiness o4.0«2- forces is the essential key if the U.S.
nilitary strategy is to be effective and credible £Ref. 19].
As uany authors and generals mentioned in their arti-
cles, tte 0-S. has a deterrence defense policy. The RCK is
one of tie aost important allies. Thus it can not be denied
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that fCK is vital to C-S. defense strategy, tut there exist
iiany fiotlems that mcst be solved on a short- term basis and
en a Icng-term basis.
E. ICGIfllCS STBATEGl FOB BCK DEFENSE
1- lh§ Prob lems cf BOK Mili tary Logistics
a- Difficulty of Sustained Logistics Support
Brigadier General Hinfield S. Scott, USA (Bet.)
,
stated ttat ;
Very few countries have a sustaining logistic support
capalility. There is nothing threatening about basic
logistics, therefcie this type of commodity is net too
attractive to the leaders or allied countries who want
to impxcve their defenses. They are auare of the fact
that sustaining logistic support is expensive in
dollars^ manpower, education and time, ana the mere
sophisticated the weapon and its capabilities, the
greater the need fcr effective logistic support in the
event cf tostilities [fief. 20].
As Scott nentioned above, the BOK does not have
the sustairing logistics support capability. In recent
years whenever hostilities have erupted in the Middle East
they have been of relatively short duration because cf the
lack cf sustaining logistic support on both sides. Ncne of
the antagonists have had the combat consumaJDles for the Icng
haul, thus making them dependent on the outside wcrld for
support in the long lun £fief. 20]. ROK military leaders lay
not concern themselves with support other than initial
support tecause the key to success in the event of hostili-
ties is surprise and a short war, which is terminated before
the U.S. have time tc react. Once the U.S. does react, it
controls the pace of warfare with its follow-on logistics
unless the North Korea is militarily superior to the South
Korea anc can end thirgs quickly. The U.S. has to decide
whether cr not it is to its advantage to provide ccmtat
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forces cr support forces or tcth- If the O.S.comtat fcrces
are provided, there is always the possibility that the USSR
cr Chljia uiil al£o ccnoiit its conil)ataiits.
t. Maintaining Operational Readiness
General John J. Hennessey stated that ;
Military strategy and readiness are so closely related
that ttey can not te separated. Readiness encompasses
such diverse things as the positioning of men and
mateiiel at strategic locations^ the maintenance of a
high level of operational capacity and preparedness in
both active and reserve ccmpcnents, and the maintenance
of adeguate logistics capabilities to sustain ccmbat.
It can be misleadirg and dangerous to use the word read-
iness in place of the deed. It would be pointless tc
spend billions of dcllars fcr weapons, equipment, var
reserves, airlift and sealift- if we did not have the
ability to use ttem to the fullest if required.
Maintaining operaticnal readiness involves; Deployment
planning^ unir training, contingency planning £Be£. IS].
As General Hennessey noted above, the BCK lili-
tary personnel should have the ability to use the weapons,
eguipierts, and any Jcind of logistics hardware components
which will be given to the RCK military forces at the time
cf hostilities. Ever though the ROK military forces can get
the weapons which have excellent capabilities, either from
IMS program or grant aid of the U.S., if the ROK military
personnel has no capability to use them effectively and
efficiently, they will be useless. Therefore, what is
needed fcr the fiOK ailitary forces is that at least the
logistics personnel should be trained to teach the field
users hew to use tie specific weapon system in a shcrt
period cf time, and to avoid the undesirable process of
teaching. Ihe 0-S-, if it has any plan to give weapon system
support, should give them as scon as possible, not later or
at the ettergency. Shat should be done by the ROK lilitary
leaders is that; ii they have any plan or schedule tc get
letter heapon systems, they should do it as scon as
an
possitJe, in order tc help the operational readiness cf the
fOK iiiJitary forces.
c. Logistics Strategy for the Future
Colonel Harry L- Gregory^ Jr., USAF, stated
that;
It is readily apparent that UASF lacks a viable logis-
tics strategy to neet the future. Instead of a single
integrated and integrating set of ideas- beliefs, and
concepts, we have had a ccaplejc and sometimes contradic-
tory melange of notions. Ixttle changed since UUII^ cur
current support concept has failed to adapt to environ-
ment dynaEics. The evolution of technology on the mcdern
battle field has ccnfronted strategy with the realities
of finite resources ; at least one logistics factor will
always impose limits on a military force. A new frame-
work fcr logistics support, a logistics strategy, is
needed to ensure full realization of war-fighting poten-
tial iics available resources. £Be£« 22].
fie can think of the problem argued by Gregory as
addressirg the fiCK military forces. At any time, the £0K
iiilitary forces must have the ability to cope with any kind
of hcstilities of the North Korean military forces, tut as
we have already seen in the previous chapter, fiOK military
forces are inferior to the North Korean military forces,
therefore, if there is no 0.5. ground force in Korean
Peninsula , the stability of fiCK might be in danger. Further
more, tie ICK should analyze the capaJaility of U.S. nili-
tary forces whether or not it can provide combat forces in
case cf Korth Korean hostilities. After analyzing the pcssi-
tilitj ci provision cf the U.S. combat forces, ECK nilitaiy
forces must have contingency planning which the EOK fcrces
alone can cope with the North Korean hostilities, or can do
it with C-S-_ logistics support only.
d. Knowledge about logistics
Knowledgeable logistics leadership, guidance,
and pclicy are necessary to create a single logistics
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cperatict fccused on attaining the correct objective, lili-
tary capatility. No nilatary force can be entirely effective
in carrying out its aission, no matter how outstanding it
may ie, without logistics. The complexities of ailitary
logistics are such that persons appointed to senior manai^e-
lent positions who don't possess a depth of logistics
experience and understanding can't provide effective leader-
ship to this multifac€ted operation in the near term.
Rhat maxes this problem worse is that acst offi-
cers, especially yourg competent officers, want to te on the
ccmmanding line. They don't want to be supply officers or
logistics-related staff officers. This problem is net only
the property of the BCK military officers, it may also occur
in the D.S- military. There may be many reasons why they
avoid heing the supply officers. One apparent reason is the
promcticn cpportcnity- In other words, the promotion rate of
the operational field is higher than the logistics field,
especially in The fiCi( Army. It may also be true in ether
services of ROK military.
€. Logistical fiealities of ROK Military Forces
Rhile strategies and tactics are guicXly adcpted
to changing situations and objectives, the logistics system
is a large and a complex process reguiring complete and
careful maragement tc maJce any sufficient changes in objec-
tives or results.
Given this environment, it should be understacd-
able that changes Jiay require years to institute. Any
external chcinge that affects the production base, the
quality cf repair, cr the transportation system can dramati-
cally change the capability of the logistics network to
support lilitary forces. Hhile weapon systems and their
resource requirements have become more complex and expen-
sive, the funding levels necessary to support these systems
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have cccasionally been reduced. This problem cculd be
confrcDtcd by any free world nations which may be in
econciic recession. It rec^uires the reduction of furding
levels, especially in logistics field of the military, in
this situation, we should consider any kind of alternatives
for savings.
2- Alternatives to Sol ve the Problems
£efcre developing alternatives, we should recognize
that Forea is the 0.£. ally which has the highest possibili-
ties of getting involved in trouble. In developing alterra-
tives tc solve the probleas mentioned in the previous
section, we can consider the alternatives which the U.S. oay
follow, because the U.S. policy in relation to the RCK mili-
tary forces, especially in logistics field, has great
impacts en the logistics strategy which the ROK nilitary
will fellow. The possible alternatives which can be devel-.
oped by the fiOK military forces might depend on the types of
support by the U.S. Therefore, we may need to develop the
alternatives that the U.S. could choose, and then the £0K
military forces could develop its own alternatives.
The first possible alternative is to provide mili-
tary advisors, newer and better weapons, and the combat
consuieables such as ammunition and repair parts without
sending logistics support troops. This was essentially the
courses of action followed during the early stages of
Vietnam war. Learning how to provide effective and sophisti-
cated logistic support is an all but impossible task when
undertaken concurrent with the deliveries of eguipnent,
supplies and-amfflunition. Not only is war-time support of an
army more difficult than peace-time support, there is also a
need for a tig expansion of the in-country logistic support
system, particularly in the field of conbat consumeable
eguipaent and supplies £Bef. 20].
87
Ihe secoEd possible alternative is to provide logis-
tics support trocps in addition to the first alternatives,
logistics support activities such as supply, mainteEance,
transportation, and particularly supply and invertcry
contrcl require many specialists with diverse skills and
experience viorkirg tccether as a team £Bef. 20]. Therefore,
if the 0-£. would net provide logistics support trocps with
the tewer weapon systems, it might take longer time to
obtain tie sJllIIs recuired to maintain and support the EOK
ailitary forces. However, the second option offers a good
possitility for the EOK military forces to get the ability
ci mairtaining the acst improved logistics capability in a
short period of time.
It is apparent that the favorable option to the EOK
is the secccd one, either in a peace tijse or in an active
war. However, ve may not be sure which option is the better
cne to tte U.S.. Therefore, we need some analysis. This
analysis should start from the analysis of the sufport-
ability of the U.S. combat force, because the U.S. logistics
support folicy to tie ROK uilitary may change according to
the suppcrtability of the U.S. combat force.
3. Analysis
a. Supportatility of the U.S. Military Forces
He must recognize that while the U.S. Army had
only two more divisions in 1S68 than the sixteen it has
today, total army strength has been cut in half ; 1.57
ttillicr aen in FY 1968 to 780,000 men in Fy 1976. While some
of this reduction can be attributed to the reduction of two
divisions, the elimiration of headquarters, change in orga-
rizaticnal structure, and other improvements resulticg in
greater overall efficiency, most of the reduction has been
at the expense of the follow-on and sustaining logistioal
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suppcxt forces £ Bef- 20], Rith such a cut back in Icgis-
tical su^fott forces, U.S. leaders of today face essentially
the sane situaticn ttat existed in 1965 when the Repufclic of
^ietraa Deeded mere help. The 0,S, has only two real opticus
then, and 0.5. has oily two now;
(1). Either the coumitment of U.S. combatant fcrces to
fight in anotter country's battle. (2). Cr the
unleashing of the nuclear arsenal.
The nuclear soluticn was never a viable one and
the Onit€d States* s devastating experience with the fcrmer
has Eade this option almost as infeasible. The build-up of
Army ccnlat forces ic Vietnam was completely dependent uj^on
the rate at which logistic support units could be activated,
trained and deployed. Logistic support units were not
available in the active Army to support deployed forces. In
Vietnam Har, O.S. refused to activate reserves which
included or organized most of the logistics units. If they
had been available, they could have been sent to Vietnam to
provide base (rear area) logistic support for the Army of
Vietnam, and the U.£. leaders would have another option.
This cpticn would not only have enabled the Vietnamese high
commard tc convert aany thousands of Vietnamese logistics
troops tc ccmbat soldiers. It could also have reduced the
need for D.£. Army units to become engaged in combat opera-
tions. It is very difficult to provide sustaining logistic
support en short notice £Bef. 20].
There is one more factor that should be cocsid-
ered when we analyze the possiblity of providing ccmbat
forces of the O.S. in case of the North Korea hostilities.
General Cattpn stated that;
We lust iiclude the people as a vital part of the tctal
force fclicy. Becatse of our democratic way of life - agovement of, by and for the people - the national
leadership must respond to the moods of our society -
even if the mocds are marred by misunderstanding. They
appear to lack an urderstanding of the external threat.
8S
fand appear iiidifferect to the need for an adequate
restcnse to the qrcfciing threat. This misunderstandiEg,
if trarslated into rational decisions, could seriously
weaken our country's military posture. Ihe uilitary
"ower cf our cpporent conticues to grow. At the same
.ime, «e find marj in American society reluctant tc
accept ttis fact and tc respond with the resources
necessary to naintain an America with sufficient uili-
tary strength to execute cur national policy. Future of
the U.£. to maintain an adequate military posture would
undermine allied ccnfidence in our capability and will-
ingness to fulfil existing international agreemerts.
American do believe in peace and in the freedoE and
dignity of each huaan teing [Ref. 21]
For the difficulty of providing U-S, ccmlat
forces tc the allied countries, Winfield S. Scott USA (Bet.)
suggested the strategics logistic command^^ in U.S.
What is urgently needed tc provide a real credibility
for the United States^s foreign policy is a strategic
logistics comjuand that cculd provide both initial and
sustaining support en short notice. Then, should any of
its allies become irvolved in hostilities and it were to
the advantages of the U.S. to assist that country, the
State department cculd negotiate the necessary agree-
ments lihereby the strategic logistic command would take
over all in-country base-type logistic support. This of
course wculd release all aJtle-codied personnel in the
allied ccuntry to fight. £fi€£. 20].
It may be natural for us to think that the U.S.
should ccnsider the kind of alternative suggested in the
previous section, ii the U.S. wants to Xeep its leadeiship
in the free world, ard wants tc help its allies which may be
involved in difficultj. If this strategic logistics ccnmand
came intc being in the U.S., the fiOK military should have
some kind of organization that can work with its trcops.
Even if the U.S. nilitary didn*t have an organization
similar tc the strategic logistics command, the ROK ailitary
forces most consider a organization which can meet the rcle
as a jsediatcr betweer the U.S. and BOK military forces in
case cf unexpected hcstilities by North Korea.
3'See £Eef. 20 p{. 73-75].
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J:. Rec[uirem€Dts of Military Logistics
As we discussed xd the previous chapter, the
noderi: art of war is composed of three coec^ual, iDdeperdest
elements ; strategy^ tactics, logistics. Proficiencj within
each eleiect and cosprehensive integration of all elements
are prerequisite to success on the battle field. Ihe evolu-
tion cf technology in warfare has settled any question of
the criticality cf Icgistics. An effective fighting force is
contingent en those fcrces which the logistics community can
naJce available for combat and then sustain through the
requisite period of conflict.
Ve are ncu confronted by a numerically superior
enemy whcse doctrine places foremost emphasis on surprise.
He posses Sanger CoaDandos capable of seizing our aerial
ports, ccmmunication centers, air base, and logistics facil'
ities. Therefore, it will be necessary to protect the logis-
tics facilities frcs the sudden attack of the Banger
Commaodcs.
Many worthwhile initiatives have focused atten-
tion en ccst-ef fective analyses of a scenario so detailed
that fleiibility of the force to meet any unexpected ccctin-
gency becooes guesticrable. Because of skyrocketing costs,
extended production lead times, and increased ccnplexity,
modern weapon systems will be retained in the inventory for
increasingly longer periods than was experienced in the
past.
Fred Gluck stated that during peace times, aili-
tary forces became the butt of social, economic, and polit-
ical pressures which cause the establishment of secondary
objectives. " These objectives, although seemingly scurd,
detract Ircn available resources, create new priorities, and
generally t€nd to shift the focus of military forces (logis-
tics in {articular) from their primary objective to those
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seccDcary ohjectives. The enemy's percepticn of our nili-
tary power, and therefore its deterrent effect on them, is
tased primarily en the tangible evidence of military ca^a-
tility provided ty tte logistics operation, rather than on
any strategic or tactical plans proposed by the operatioral
eiemert cf the forces. During peace time, planned strat-
egies and tactics shape the requirements of military logis-
tics. However, during wartiue, military logistics limits
and shapes the strategies and tactics that can he inple-
aented through the aacunt and type of military capability it
provides to the comhat forces £Bef. 243«
Again for the RCK lilitary forces, it locks like
peacetiae, but in fact it is a semi-war period. The nilitary
capability cf ROK is inferior to North Korea, there is a
urgent need to increase military capability of the EOK. If
the required amount cf military capability can't be created
during the state of preparing for war, then the probability
that it can be attained while waging war is significantly
low, unless we are engaged in a long-lived, low-order,
converticnal war.
Therefore, again it is reguired to increase
ffilitaiy capability, and to increase military capability cf
EOK^ it should be weapons-oriented logistics concurrently
Kith Jiairtaining perscnnel-oriented logistics. ^e
The industrial base is absolutely critical to
the ccEtinuing needs cf military forces. It must be recog-
nized that at any given pcint in time, when war lay be
initiated, the amount of nilitary capability that can be
created, and therefore the amount of military power that can
be applied, -is based on those resources currently pcssessed
by the nilitary, and not en what will be provided in the
future by the industrial base.
3«Perscnnel oriented logistics includes food, shelter,
clothing, aedlcal, training,. . .etc. See [fief. 23 pp. 16].
If we reexamine the Vietnamese War, the U.S.
forces ftcvided much logistic support to the Vietnamese
forces, tut they were not used effectively because cf lack
cf training.
What is lequired today urgently ty the BOK and
D.S. iiilitary forces in Korean Peninsula is the practical
training of currently existing weapon systems which can be
given tc the ROK military forces by U.S. military forces.
And further, fiCK needs continual assessment of nilitary
capaiility of its cwn forces compared to North Korean
forces. If it will still be inferior to that of North Kcrea,
the Q.S. ground forces are reguired until the BOK nilitary
forces can uage the var.
'•• log istics Strate^^ for The flOK Militar y Forces
a. The Necessity for Understanding flilitary
logistics
The logistics strategy that should considered at
first is the necessity of understanding the importance and
true aearinc of military logistics by higJi military offi-
cers, for this matter, Fred Gluck stated that;
Within the military today there exists a major crcfclen
which car not be elimj.nated by additional defense
spending. This picblem is the failure of the TcO tc
fully understand nilitary logistics and its significance
to the primary function of the military forces.
Deficiencies in the logistics environment steming from
this lack of understanding directly impact the nation's
military forces. These impacts result in ;
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To overccnie these deficiencies, the followings^' shculd be
accottf listed.
1. Military logistics must be viewed as a major segment
of the military forces, and must be recognized as a
branch of military science equal to tactics and
strategy. Military Icgistics must be integrated
across the military complex as an essential part of
the management and the cation's military capability,
2. lie current nilitary Icgistics need transiticr from
vintage WWII Icgistics to modern military logistics.
Ihe fiOK can dc longer afford to treat military Icgis-
tics with some level of ignorance. The importances of
strategies and tactics Dotuithstanding, modern mili-
tary logistics is the basis of military power, i.e.,
the level and duraticn of war that can be waged by
ccmtat forces, therefore, the effective and efficient
operation of ocdern military logistics is critical to
the scifety and survival of the ROK. Modem military
Icgistics must provide the assurance that concept,
structure, fccus, and management of military logis-
tics are present and effectively aligned to provide
for the needs cf today's military forces in general
and its combat forces in particular.
3. Successful implementation can not occur until the
necessary Jcnouledge and understanding of modern sili-
tary logistics are provided to the field.
IcplementatioE requires that ;
(a). Senior MND (Ministry of National
Defense) officials must fully understand the
true role, objective, and importance cf mili-
tary Icgistics in the present forces.
3'For ffcre detail relevant to the U.S. military forces,
see £ief. 23 pp. 13-17], and £Bef. 24 J.
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(b) . From this newly formed understanding
there must originate a single MND-ap^roved
ccncept of aodern military logistics fchich
will provide to the field, along with ctter
inforiation and guidance, a total view of
militaiy logistics within the MND (what it
is, what it does, and what it seeks to
achieve) .
After these requirements are net, either the
individual services cr the EOK Army Logistics Command (AIC)
can tegin tc shape ard then to initiate the required tran-
siticc tc a modem military logistics operation. The keys to
this effort are knovledge and understanding.
0) Majcr Cont ents That Shoul d Be Underst ood .
To understand the rcle and significance of military logis-
tics, the following scenarios oust be understood.
(a) . The possible objectives of lilitary
forces of acy nation should be ;
1). Deterrence of war
2). Defend its nation from enemy's
attack
3). Supporting national objectives
However, the primary function of military
forces is tc wage soae level of war, when called upon. for
Korea, especially in the present time, the required nilitaiy
function might be tc deter war in Korean Peninsula aid to
support rational objectives which may be continual growth,
and finally to defend the attacks of present and future
potential enemies.
(b) . In order to accomplish ROK Military
functions aentioned above, fiOK Military Forces must always
have a capability to wage some required level of war.
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ic) . Id today's miiitary environmeDt, arned
conflicts are waged ij sophisticated weapons. Theretcze , the
capability to wage war is frcvided to the ccmbat forces ty
tiie Icgistics en«iroittent (system; in the form of sustaiced
operaticral weapons. Here we need the definition of military
capatility. flilitari capability, defined by fred Gluck, is
the ancunt cf war that can be waged by these weapons, stated
in quantitative tens. It is defined as the irtecsity
(power) and duration cf war that can be waged by operational
weapons possessed by ccmbat forces. Military capability is
the fuECticn of ;
1). The number of operational weapcES
2). The power of this weapons (the sum
of their capability characteristics)
.
3). The duration of use cf that
pcwer^i.e., the maximum number of tines
that the weapon can be exercised in
ccabat until it no longer can be kept
operational. This has strong logistical
liiitaticns on the military capability.
fiut, as we discussed in the comparison of the military
forces between EOK and North Korea, The fiOK is inferior in
the tumter cf weapons and its capability.
(d) . Fred Gluck stated that military capa-
tilitj is the product of military logistics system. Tien
any activity, organization, or agency within the MNL *ihich
contributes directly or indirectly to the creation and
sustaining cf militarj capability is in fact a part of the
flilitary Icgistics system.
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(e) . In creating any sustaining military
capatility there is a natural order*o to the major cfera-
tions or segments of the militaty logistics system.
i< Total Logistics Environment (system) >|,





|< Creates and Sustains Military Capability >|
Figure 5.1 logistics FIoh.
lo scs€ extent, ROB nilitary forces are superior to North
Korea in the field of personnel-oriented logistics, tut need
some iapicvement in the w eapcns-oriented logistics field,
especially in R&L, and acguisition. But, the important fact
that «hcold be understood is that the personnel- oriented
logiscics remains ax essential ingredients in bcth the
acccaplishment of the logistics objective and primary func-
tion of the military forces.
(f) - Military logistics provides a level of
military capability hhich allows for the implementaticn of
tactical decisions. Eut, it is important to note that it is
also fcssible for military logistics to restrict the imple-
aentation of tactical decisions because of a reduced level
of military capability. In ether words, the operational
planning should be changed according to the increase or
decrease in the capalility of military logistics.
40pi
reprc
^F gure 5.1 represents the logistics flow,
duced from £fief« 23 pp. 15].
and it is
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Acccffiplishing the above content cculd be
done ty scheduling special sessions or lectures in Ihe Army
Stafi College aid in The National Defense College cf the
ECK.
t. A fiOK Special Logistics Force
C) The Neces sity of Organizing A Special
Logistics forc e. It would be worthwhile to
exaaine the ne^essit^ and concept of a strategic logistics
force suggested by Brigadier General Scott for better logis-
tics strategy of the BOK military forces. He stated the
necessity of a strategic logistics force as follow;
As Icng as credible nuclear capabilities are in being
the 0-i. must find ways of competing in the fcreigc
policy area without running the rxsk or super poker to
superpower confrontation. if the U.S. is to retain its
leadership in the free world, it must not only deter the
direct aggression cf any world power that has the caja-
bility or attacking O.S., it must also provide support
for its friends through the world. Such begins with
providing allies the necessary weapons and equipment
which tteir aried forces must have to defend thesselves.
It shculd not end here, however, it must continue with
an effective means of providing sustained logistic
sutfcrt tc its friends whenever they attacked by surro-
?at€ armed forces cf another country. Sustained logis-
ic£ support means more than weapons, eguipmert and
coalat ccnsumeables. It means logistics, trained logis-
tics troops, management, and command control, which cnly
countries with advaiced technologies have the capability
of providing on shcrt notice £Bef. 20].
fiOK should try to maintain and support the
veapczs and eguipment furnished under the provisicn of the
grant aid program by the 0. S. government. Rhat is needed in
an emergency is both logistics and logistics troops whc can
jrove in and take o^er base-type or wholesale logistics
support thereby releasing the able-bodied to fight.
As a historical evidence of the necessity
of this kind of strategic logistics command, we can consider
the Vietnan War. luring the early days of the Vietram
involvement, the O.i. opted to have its soldiers fight the
98
iattle rather than picvide for tase depot (rear area) logis-
tics support of the BVNAP. Ihis rear area mission, which was
referred to by many as "Ihe Enclave Concept" was not adopted
ty the 0.5. Military Assistarce Coimnand. The commaEd chcse
instead the Strategic Hamlet Concept and an active comtatant
role for the U.S. Armed forces. With the possible exception
of a few unique or esergency situations, the U.S. aid did
not picvide depot or base type logistics support for the
BVNAF during the conflict. All supplies furnished ty the
O.S. government became the property of the Vietnamese
goverrient when cff-lcaded at the port, in other words, it
was theirs to use or abuse. Brigadier General Scott stated
that it is unconceivahle that the American people will ever
again permit the utilization of the U.S. combatant forces in
a war wlerein there is any alternative short of complete
capitulation and surrender cf the U.S. £fief« 20].
Vietnam was asked to shoulder an ever-
increasirg burden of fighting, using American materials. Ihe
Vietnaiization program was logistics at its test in direct
suppcrt cf national policy and strategy. Its climax was
Project Enhance flus. Project Enhance Plus was designed to
provided the BVNAf kith more combat equipment and improved
logistics sufficiency. Prior to the project, the U.S. had
beening providing a logistical support to the £outh
Vietramese ailitary ever an extended period, while at the
same time helping fight the battle. Now with the goal cf the
total withdrawal of U.S. imminent, the Vietnamization
process tad to be couplete and had to be sufficient. Ihere
were twc prcblems ; the magnitude of operation, and a tight
schedule {BeJ. 21],
To avoid this kind of problem in RCK, the
EOK should have orgarized a special logistics force uhich
can operate with the U.S. or allies* logistics troops in
case cf hostilities in Korean Peninsula.
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(2) General Ccnc ept of A Special Lc^i sties
Force. He can assume that the peac€-time
logistics support of the U.S. to the fiOK will continue, and
in case cf any hostilities cf the North Korea, the HCF nay
ask icr additioral ielp to the U.S. and/or to the allied
countries. Upon the request of additional support, the U.S.
could provide either combat forces or logistics sufpcrt
troops ex tcth. At the initial stage of the hostilities,
the currently existirg U.S. ground forces will taXe part in
the war. Hcwever, if the ROK ailitary and U.S. ground forces
Hill succeed in tlocXing the initial hostilities, there is
good pcssii:ilities that the ccnflict will continue over seme
extended period cf tine. 3y this time, the President cf the
U.S. will determine whether cr not withdraw the existing
U.S. grcund forces. If we assume the U.S. withdraw its
ground fcrce from Korean Peninsula, even though this with-
drawal should net happen, the U.S. may provide cnly the
logistics troops concurrent with some advanced sophisticated
weapon systems. Based on this assumption, there should te a
nilitary crganizaticn that can accept the logistics support
and operate the giver systems or eguipment by the team which
may he composed of tie special logistics force of the EOK
and tie strategic logistics force of the U.S.and/or that of
allied countries'. Ihis special logistics force may be the
combined organizaticr of three military services, i.e..
Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. This special
logistics fcrce could be operated during both peace time and
war time.
(•3) Detailed Concept of E mployme nt of BOK
-Special Icqistics Force.
(a) . The Ccncept of Operation
The ccncept of the operation or
niissicn of this special logistics force would be;
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1) . The neiDbers of this special logis-
tics force can work with the U.S. or allied countries'
logistic suffort forces.
2) . It can accept the arms tracsfer
from the U.S., if the^ withdraw their ground forces in feace
time cr war time-
3} . This logistics force oust be
trained to accept the logistics support of the U.S. and/or
allied ccuntries.
4). It could be trained during the
coffltined e^cercises such as *^Team Spirit Exercise", or if the
U.S. dispatch any kind of strategic logistics force for
exercise, they could le trained at that time.
5) . For ahove operations, the neces-
sary pert cr ground facilities and the communicaticn netwcrk
oust te established in advance.
6) . It could assume the current
weapons procurement responsibilities.
7). It should have the atility to
request the reguired eguipaent and components. For these
activities, close monitoring of the logistics status of the
combat forces will be reguired, and must respond guickly to
the reguest of the ccsbat forces.
(b) • Organization And Other Considerations
1) . It could be one of the units cf
the Ccibined. Forces Ccnmand (CFC) , or DPA (Defense Procurement
Agency) cf EOK.
2) . It should be composed of Amy,
Navy and Marine Corps, and Air force logistics representa-
tives tc support their unique nilitary branch.
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3). If there is any sinilar crganiza-
tion IE the 0. S.^ it should have some connection cr cigari-
2atior which act as liaison or mediator.
4) . To avoid confusion and increase
effectiveness, this special logistics force should be
comhined with^ if eiist, current organizations which have
the sinilar responsifilities.
5) . The active duty members should
have tie ability to communicate with related foreign logis-
tics ticcfs, in ctler words, there should be nc language
problems, iictually, the language training will be required
continually, as long as the ECK is recipient of any support.
(c) . Expected advantages from a special
logistics Force
By adopting this special logistics
force, tlere might be some advantages ;
1). The fiCK military could have mere
combat forces than before adopting this policy.
2). The combat forces could get more
effective and efficient war-time logistics support, because
it could be done trained personnel and by preplanned
schedule.
3) . The ROK military forces can fight
kith the enemy, even if the O.S. ground forces wculd be
withdraw! during the peace tiae.
c. -Acguisiticn Strategy
When we consider a weapon acguisitioD strategy,
he shculd think of the life-cycle costing and the acquisi-
tion piccess.
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O) Life-cyc le Costing . Gereral
Jack J- Catton^ USAF, emphasizes the life-cycle costing as a
froccreaent strategy, and also other procurement related
documents of the U.S. state the same contents.
Bistciicallj, when a weapon system approached th€ active
inventcrj, logistics has two prime responsibilities ;
(a) . To support the design which the engineers had
produced.
(1) . To design the support required in order to do
that effectively. Logistics was expected to prepare
itseJf to supply, maintain and modify that system from
the time it tegan its service until its missicn
ccupleted. Today, as in the past, the day-to-day husi-
ness cf the logistics ccmmand is maintenance, supply
and aodif icaticn, i.e., improving its ability to
support the operational design through more efficient
crganizaticn, improved computer capability, refined
manufacturing techniques and concepts, and ether leas-
ures. However, we new have the addition of a third
responsibility. National fiscal constraints, which
have forced a continuous search to do better, had
ccapelled us tc get into design cycle early eccugh to
preclude as aany costly logistics problems as
possible. This means design for support [Bef. 21].
Experience gained over the past years indicates that
UO-6035*' of tie total life-cycle costs for a weapon
sjsteiL can be tied to the basic logistics support
elements. If he are going to maxe economies and effi-
ciencies in our support, we must consider the logis-
tics sjjpport ittfact during the design process. We must
induce developnert engineers in the military services
and among defense contractors to give proper weight to
»Se€ £Eef, 21 pp. 10-12],
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ultimate sufpcrt costs. However, the designer is
ccEceined aiDout meeting the operational parameters -
how fast, how iar, how higii- The manufacturer is also
ccrceined with cow, i.e., he is reluctant tc spend
itcEey now to save moEe;y in the future. All cf tiiese
resistance is natural enough, but it can't be
pemitted to ccntinue. Somebody has to realize that
support costs ever a life-cycle of a weapon system
will have the mere important impact on availability of
resources to operate, maintain - and most important,
tc modernize. Ihe one who must keep his eye en future
costs is the Icgisticiar. The designers, contractors
and operations people must keep an open mind tc the
advantages of life-cycle costing. If we fail tc enpha-
size logistics and life-cycle cost implications, we'll
have permitted the purchase of less military strength
with the dollars spent £Bef- 21]. For better logis-
tics support, the EOK military should adapt the life-
cycle costing itethod.
(2) Need for Some Change in Acq uisition
Process. One more consideration is the
acguisition piccess which can help the acquisition
strategy formulation. As we discussed in the earlier
secticn, the EOK military forces acquire advanced
weapon systems through the FUS program of the U.S. And
when we consider the weapon systems acquisition, it
will be necessary to to think the impacts cf fMS
prcgram on the U.S. and ROK industry. General F.
flichale Eogers, USAF, stated about the FMS as fcllcws;
£es€circh and development costs, as well as produc-
tion and administrative costs associated with IKS,
are charged tc the purchasing government. In this
way- foreign sales are recoverinq a substantial
fart of D. S. R 6 D costs. ... foreign military
sales eliminate gaps in production lines, keep
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facilities ccen, and retain skilled em^ilcyees.
IMS program thereby aaintains at least a pcrtion
cf the national industrial base that cculd
sustained otieryise [Bef. 25].
The IMS program provides the ROK or any
allies ct the U.S. iiith the opportunities to prepare and
encourage their cvn defense. However, to some extent, the
EOK is ielping the U.S. defense related industry khich
require highly advanced technology, as mentioned ty Gereral
fiogers. If the fiOB continues to accept the FHS program
kithcut its oun development program, it uill lose many
things. Fcr example, it will take time to get advanced tech-
nology fxcjB western ccuntries, and it will be difficult to
retain tie techniciacs who get the highly advanced tech-
nology frca abroad because of lack of related industries.
Ihe £CK oilitary should have some development program. The
apparent thing is the technicians who get the education from
abroad are working in the foreign countries. In some sense,'
this simple example shows that the fiOK has teen losing the
potentiality of further growth of advanced technology.
Another thing which should be recognized
ty the FCK is the fact that the FMS program of the U.S.
helps the maintenance of the employment levels of the U.S..
[Bef. 25]- Therefore, what is needed for the ROK is that it
should apply the FMS program by selective basis. In ether
words, if any weapcc systems or equipment which cculd be
produced with its own potential production facilities, with
some E SB work, the fiOK should develop them within the
country. Tiie acquisition strategy should be changed by
careful assessment of many variables such as technology and
the indostry of the £CK.
For example, if the BOK has advanced tech-
nology ard industry base to develop a sophisticated weapon
systei with some assistance of the U.S., it should be
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d«vtici€d hy the fiOK itself for the long-term point of view.
If tte ECK does not adopt this acquisition strategy and
purchase weapons and nilitary equipment, the defense-related
techEclcgy may not te developed as rapidly, and the BOK
nilitary forces have to purchase necessary weapons and
eguipients continually from the U.S. and/or from the foreign
countries. However, the adoption of this policy needs mere
detail atalysis in terms of costs and other possible disad-
vantaces which are net discussed in this thesis.
Another thing that should be considered
carefully hy the fiOK is the fact that administrative costs
ether than E & D costs and production costs, associated with
FMS are charged to the purchasing government, i.e., the fiCK.
James £. Schiffman stated in his newspaper article that ;
U.5. defense contractors fear that a new organization.
The Military Mutual Aid Association, set up to aid south
Korean military retirees may cost U.S. companies added
expense and troufle in selling weapons tc Kcrea
£fi€f. 26].
If there exist tco mary middle agencies in procuring weapon
systems frott foreign countries, the apparent fact is that
the prccuring costs kill increase in the end, because the
commissions given to the agencies should be included in the
administrative costs of the contractors. Also there might be
some advantages to the ROK from this organization, if it
will te combined with the existing agencies, if not exist,
and operated effectively and efficiently. This nay need
careful aralysis, especially in terms of competitive
contracting principles.
- In ceneral, what is needed for the ECK is
the necessity of charce of its military equipment or weapon
systetts acquisiticn/piocurement process. It could be
combined with the special logistics force which is suggested
in the previous secticn.
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71. CONCIDSION ANE BECOflMEMDAIIONS
It is cecessary to understand the basic concepts and
neanins ct logistics and strategy, ii we are to frcperly
prepare logistics strategy ior business or military fields.
Ontil ncH, considerable time and effort has been devoted
toward the developmert of strategic and tactical alterna-
tives tc increase profit in the business fields and to
defend national interests and to win in the battle fields,
either in active war or cold war. However, logistics has
always been treated as the secondary important fields or in
some cases has been totally neglected. Now, it is tine to
stop considering the strategy and tactics only, either in
business or military fields. Bather, much more attention
must be placed on logistics tc survive in the ccrpcrate
battle fields and to defend the countries of the free world
Irom the threats of tbe communist world.
Ihe importance cl the military logistics can cot be
denied in the defense of the Republic of Korea. It is in
fact tte ccrnerstone of the military forces, because it
provides ccsbat forces with the capability of waging war, it
provides the only targible evidence of military power in
deterrinc the threat of the North Korea, it limits and
shapes tte strategies and tactics that can be implemented
during the waging of war, and finally its effectiveness
directly impacts the costs and capability of the ECK irili-
tary forces.
Kbat ar€_ needed urgently for the defense of the BCK in
current situations are ;
1. Ibe military commanders or planners, especially in
higi ranking levels of EOKA, fiOK Navy and Marine
Corps, and fiOK Air Force must understand the
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inpoitance of logistics tc accomplish their nissicns
or otjectives- If thej don't consider the logistics
imp licaticns cd strategic and tactical plancirg and
pcrfcrmance, it might te a waste of money tc invest
iillions cf dollars in ac>^uisition of advanced nili-
tary eguipment or weapcn systems. Therefore, they
should know logistics in connection with the
suggested scetaxios in chapter five. All officers
shculd Jd€ educated continually about logistics
through lectures or any other possible methods in the
Army, Navy, and Air force Staff College, aid in the
Military Acadenies of each three services.
2. lie fiOK should prepare for hostilities with North
Korea. In the course cf preparing for it, the fCK
ttilitary must consider the role of the U.S. ground
forces positicied in Korean Peninsula in relation to
tie U.S. defense strategy and historical evidence.
Htether or not the U.S. ground forces will fight in
another Korean conflict, the ROK military forces must
prepare for using the logistical support of the U.S.
and/or allied countries effectively. It will be
required to prepare for the acceptance of the arms
transfer duriig peace tiie and/or the acceptance of
tie logistics support during any unexpected hostili-
ties with North Korea within a short period of time.
Ihis means the necessity of new military organization
such as a special logistics force vhich could do the
jots related to the acceptance of the logistics
support of the U.S. or allied countries. This consid-
eration should be developed in more detail as soon as
possible.
3- Tie EOK military forces might be equipped by weapon
systems through the acquisition and procurement
process. As long as the £0K military forces cet
1C8
w€afcn systems or nilitary equipment through the
acquisiticn piccess, it should place an attenticn on
acguisiticn strategy. Ihe apparent fact is that the
operating and naintenance costs of any weapon systems
are larger than the initial acquisition costs. Ihis
reguires the life-cycle costing methods as an acgui-
siticn strategy. One more thing tnat should he taken
attention by the ROK military forces is the frccure-
ment process cf weapon systems from another country
cr acquire within the RCK. The more the numter of the
middleman agencies in the procurement process, the
mere the €xpecse that cculd be paid. Therefcre, it
might be cheaper to ccmbine existing organizaticns
which are related tc the weapon systems acquisition
piocess into a single entity.
Iher€ are mcuiy acre things that must be considered by
the Bcputlic of Korea military forces. However, the abcve.
three ccrsiderations should be examined in depth by the EOK
lilitary commanders or planners. As a result, it might main-
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